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Reading an article in the Economist in 2012 drew my attention to the topic of financial crisis 
and protectionism. This article claimed that protectionism and support for nationalistic 
policies had increased in many European countries since the onset of the Great Recession. As 
I at the time had studied economics for three years, I had repeatedly learned how free trade is 
good and protectionism is bad, to put it to the extreme. This triggered my attention to learn 
more about a potential counter-cyclicality of protectionism. Does it always increase in the 
wake of a financial crisis? Realising that empirical proof is lacking for small open economies, 
I decided to research this relationship for my home country, Norway. 
Working on this dissertation has taught me a lot. From the data collection, reading documents 
back the 19the century and collecting data year by year, to the empirical statistical research. 
The latter taught me a lot about adjusting time series statistics, knowledge I hope to take with 
me further. 
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how to improve my written work, and Sophie Béreau (LSM) for giving me valuable guidance 
on how to set up my regression model. Finally, I wish to thank Gabriela Stroea for proof 
reading my final work. 
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III. 
Abstract 
The present dissertation intends to explain the overall research question: “how and why does a 
financial crisis affect the average level of protectionism in Norway?” Ad valorem equivalent 
(AVE) tariffs in Norway are investigated between 1866 and 2012, covering six financial crisis. 
Cycle values measured as deviations from (Hodrick and Prescott filtered) trend are used to 
discover and compare AVE in normal times versus AVE during financial crisis. The 
relationship between AVE and various macroeconomic variables from the theory of 
endogenous protection is inspected, with the OLS technique, to understand variation in the AVE 
rate over time.  
Protectionism in Norway is found to often move countercyclically to financial crises. The AVE 
rate deviated negatively before and positively during and right after four of the financial crisis 
in Norway. However, a causal relationship is not confirmed in the OLS model.  
These deviations from trend, as well as yearly percentage changes in the AVE rate, are largely 
a result of Norway following the great powers. The United States’ AVE rate has the highest 
explanatory power and is the only significant variable that creates positive deviations from trend 
during a financial crisis. The unemployment rate also generates positive deviations from AVE-
trend. As opposed to theoretical expectations, an increase in import penetration decreases the 
average AVE rate. 
Evidence of a countercyclical relationship between a financial crisis and the AVE rate is, 
however, mainly a pre-General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) phenomenon. The 
introduction of GATT sharply reduced the actual AVE rate in Norway. It also changed how 
AVE responded to the, above mentioned, macroeconomic variables. Of those, inflation is the 
only significant variable in the post-GATT scenario and was found to explain why the AVE 
rate deviated positively from trend during the Banking Crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. 
 
Table of Contents 
1. Introduction and purpose of the dissertation ........................................................................1 
1.1. Research background and gap in knowledge .....................................................................1 
1.2. Research Question and Objectives ...................................................................................2 
1.3. Limitations .....................................................................................................................3 
1.4. Approach........................................................................................................................3 
2. Review on determinants affecting protectionism...................................................................5 
2.1. Definition of concepts......................................................................................................5 
2.1.1. Protectionism: .........................................................................................................5 
2.1.2. Financial crisis:.......................................................................................................6 
2.2. Theoretical foundation of counter-cyclical protection ........................................................8 
2.2.1. Political characteristics............................................................................................8 
2.2.2. Economic characteristics ....................................................................................... 10 
2.3. Evaluation of theory ...................................................................................................... 13 
2.4. Research front on protectionism and business cycles ....................................................... 14 
2.4.1. Business cycles and protectionism........................................................................... 14 
2.4.2. Empirically testing the endogenous tariff model ....................................................... 15 
3. Methodology: ...................................................................................................................... 19 
3.1. Research design and determinants ................................................................................. 19 
3.2. Data collection: ............................................................................................................ 21 
3.3. Data analysis:............................................................................................................... 24 
3.3.1. How does a financial crisis affect the level of protectionism in Norway? ................... 24 
3.3.2. Why? A model of average protectionism in Norway.................................................. 25 
4. Empirical results................................................................................................................. 27 
4.1. How: financial crisis and mapping of protectionist cycles ................................................ 27 
4.2. Descriptive data of the OLS models ................................................................................ 34 
4.3. The Time Series Regression Models................................................................................ 37 
4.3.1. Deviations from trend, with the Norwegian AVE rate as the dependent variable......... 37 
4.3.2. Percentage changes: logarithmic value and first differenced AVE Norway ................ 39 
4.3.3. Investigating the role of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT)............ 43 
4.3.4. Expanding models.................................................................................................. 43 
5. Elaboration upon findings .................................................................................................. 45 
5.1. How? ........................................................................................................................... 45 
5.2. Why? ............................................................................................................................ 46 
5.3. Counter-cyclicality in the late 20th century? ................................................................... 50 
 
 
V. 
6. Conclusions and suggestion for future research .................................................................. 52 
6.1. Suggestions for further research..................................................................................... 53 
7. List of references................................................................................................................. 54 
8. Appendices ......................................................................................................................... 62 
Appendix 1: The General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade .......................................................... 62 
Appendix 2: Filtered and deflated AVE rate, 1866-2012 ............................................................. 63 
Appendix 3: AVE rate and its HP-filtered trend, 1866-1915 ........................................................ 63 
Appendix 4: Filtered CPI rate, 1866-2012 .................................................................................. 64 
Appendix 5: Import Penetration over time including its trend line with λ=2500 ............................ 64 
Appendix 6: AVE rate and its HP-filtered trend, 1990-2012 ........................................................ 65 
Appendix 7: Residual Plots for various versions of the OLS model.............................................. 66 
Appendix 8: Residual Plots for the models used in the dissertation .............................................. 67 
Appendix 9: Testing the significance of AVEt-1 on the determinants  ............................................ 68 
Appendix 10: the OLS model (filtered) when inflation is excluded as a determinant  ..................... 69 
Appendix 11 Filtered U.S. AVE Rate ........................................................................................ 70 
Appendix 12: The OLS model of percentage change included AVE Norway t-1 ............................ 70 
Appendix 13: the OLS model (percentage change) when inflation is excluded as a determinant  .... 71 
Appendix 14: Testing different versions of the OLS model of percentage change ......................... 72 
Appendix 15: Testing Explanatory Power of GATT on the Norwegian AVE rate ......................... 73 
Appendix 16: Expanding the OLS model with more determinants  ............................................... 75 
Appendix 17: Log and first differenced Norwegian AVE rate ..................................................... 77 
Appendix 18: Direct imports as a percentage of total production by main group of industries ........ 77 
9. Glossary .............................................................................................................................. 78 
 
  
 
 
VI. 
List of Figures 
Figure 1 Triangle of trade protectionism ..........................................................................................6 
Figure 2 Norwegian AVE gaps as cycle deviations from HP-filtered trend 1866-2012 ...................... 28 
Figure 3 Norwegian AVE rates between 1915 and 1960 and HP-trend for λ100 and λ2500 ............... 31 
Figure 4 AVE Rates Between 1970 and 2012 and HP-Trend for λ100 and λ2500 ............................. 32 
Figure 5 PSE Rates between 1986 and 2012 and HP-Trend for λ100 and λ2500 ............................... 34 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1 Financial crisis in Norway since 1875 .................................................................................8 
Table 2 Explanatory variables expected from the theory of endogenous protection, Chapter 2.2.2. .... 13 
Table 3 Summary of empirical literature review ............................................................................. 17 
Table 4 Determinants that will be used in the time series regression model ...................................... 21 
Table 5 Definitions, information and sources used to collect data for dependent and independent 
variables and control variables used in this study  ........................................................................... 22 
Table 6 Testing the effect of AVEt-1 on determinants in the regression model .................................. 25 
Table 7 Norwegian AVE rates for selected years between 1875 and 1905  ........................................ 28 
Table 8 Norwegian AVE rates for selected years............................................................................ 30 
Table 9 Exchange Rate of the Norwegian Kroner in Percent of the Par value (=100)  ........................ 30 
Table 10 AVE Rates for Selected Years between 1985 and 2012 ..................................................... 33 
Table 11 AVE Rates for Selected Years between 2000-2012 .......................................................... 33 
Table 12 Pearson Correlation between AVE Norway and determinants (Norway). The determinant is, 
in all columns but for unadjusted variables, adjusted with its logarithmic value and first differenced . 35 
Table 13 Results for hypothesis testing the exogeneity of the determinants from table 4  ................... 37 
Table 14 Dependent variable: Norwegian AVE gaps as cycle deviations from HP-Filtered Trend with 
λ=2500 ....................................................................................................................................... 39 
Table 15 OLS Results. Dependent variable: First differenced and logarithmic value of Norwegian 
AVE rate between 1866 and 2012.  ................................................................................................ 42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII. 
List of abbreviations 
 
AD: Anti-Dumping 
AVE: Ad valorem Equivalents  
EEA: European Economic Area 
EFTA: European Free trade Association 
GATT: General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
GDPc: Gross Domestic Product per Capita 
HP-filter: Hodrick-Prescott Filter 
NTB: Non-tariff barriers 
NTM: Non-tariff measures 
OECD: Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
PSE: Producer Support Estimate 
UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
WTO: World Trade Organization 
 
 
 
1. 
1. Introduction and purpose of the dissertation  
In June 2012, the Economist (2012b) published an article with the title “protectionist alert: the 
world should heed warnings that barriers to trade are creeping up (The Economist, 2012b).”  
This, and similar headlines fronted several publications in the Economist and other journals.   
With the onset of the Great Recession the fear spread of a new wave of protectionism with 
similar catastrophically results as during the Great Depression in the 1930s. The Great 
Depression saw a surge of tariffs, quotas and exchange controls used to protect the domestic 
market from foreign goods. World trade collapsed and remained low in the next decade despite 
the recovery of the worldwide economy (Eichengreen & Irwin, 2009).  
As a resort to improve world trade, the period after the Second World War saw a surge in 
international trade and currency cooperation, with countries ratifying the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and pegging their currencies to the dollar. As a result, the overall 
level of transparent measures of protectionism such as tariffs decreased dramatically. 
Despite these increasing global trade connections, the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and development’s (OECD) Secretary-General Angel Gurría stressed that there will still be a 
strong temptation towards protectionism due to the undermining effect of the financial crisis 
(OECD Newsroom, 2012). Large international trade organisations such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the OECD have called for the G20 countries to resort from any trade 
disgracing actions. After all, the concept of globalization is not a new phenomenon. There was 
a time before the trade collapse when the global trade environment was open and more 
liberalized.   
 
1.1. Research background and gap in knowledge 
There has long been a consensus that protectionism tends to rise in recessions and fall in booms  
forming a countercyclical relationship between the average level of protectionism and 
recessions. Gallarotti (1985), Ray (1987), Grilli (1988), Bohara and Kaempfer (1991) and 
Bagwell and Staiger (2003) all found empirical evidence of a countercyclical relationship 
between protectionism and recessions. 
The evidence of counter-cyclicality is mainly based upon data from large and powerful 
countries and regions such as the United States of America (USA) and the European Union 
(EU). It has been proposed that the effects of a financial crisis is not the same for small open 
economies as they do not have the power to influence the world price. Consequently, these 
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countries will not benefit from protectionism (Bagwell & Staiger, 2003). Bagwell and Staiger 
(2003) ask for more research on countries that fit into the category of small and open. 
The present dissertation contributes to this request with an empirical and historical investiga t ion 
on protectionism in the small open economy of Norway, investigating trade data back to 1866, 
covering six financial crisis. 
1.2. Research Question and Objectives 
Specifically, this study intends to examine the relationship between a financial crisis and the 
level of protectionism in Norway, answering the overall research question: 
       “How and why does a financial crisis affect the average level of protectionism in Norway?” 
The average level of protectionism in Norway refers to annual, economy-wide, protection 
calculated as an average of all industry-specific protection rates. Further, this research question 
is split into two parts that will be answered in the present study: how and why.  
1. How: is there evidence of a countercyclical relationship between the average level of 
protectionism in Norway and financial crisis?  
2. Why: what determinants affect the average level of protectionism in Norway? 
3. Has the answers to objective one and two changed over the years?  
“How” is an effort to understand if Norwegian protectionism moves together with a financ ia l 
crisis, and provides a partial answer to the request by Bagwell and Staiger (2003). It will 
contribute to understand if a counter-cyclical relationship in fact is a “big country 
phenomenon.” 
Cycle values measured as deviations from (Hodrick and Prescott filtered) trend will be used to 
discover and compare protectionism in normal times versus protectionism during financ ia l 
crisis. Learning from the past can give important insights into how the Norwegian trade policy 
will respond to a crisis in the future. 
Covering six financial crisis will allow for a comparison over the years, to see if a potential 
relationship is consistent or changing over time, or between financial crisis. In particular, it is 
of interest to see if the introduction of GATT has changed the way Norwegian protectionism 
responds to a financial crisis.  
If a countercyclical relationship is found, why is that? If it is not, why? The why question takes 
insight from the endogenous protection theory. This theory uses macroeconomic variables to 
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explain the variance in protectionism. These variables are linked to the development of a 
financial crisis, and will serve as mediators between a financial crisis and the average level of 
protectionism in Norway.  
Understanding reasons behind protectionism in a small open economy can help internationa l 
trade organizations in their future task of creating global rules and regulations that better cover 
a heterogeneous group of member states. That is, a set of regulations that make sense both to 
small and large, developed and developing countries. 
1.3. Limitations  
The present study is limited to the Norwegian market, as an example of a small open 
economy. Furthermore, the analysis focuses upon the Norwegian economy as a whole rather 
than per industry.  
Due to the nature of this longitudinal design the availability of data is limited. This study 
concentrates first of all on the average tariff rates in Norway from received import duties onto 
the Norwegian customs.  This value is reported in official public reports from the Norwegian 
Statistical Bureau (SSB), and it is the only measure of protectionism available for such a long 
timeframe. These tariff rates are available for commodities and not for services.  
Numerous theoretical themes have emerged during the years that intend to explain the 
determinants of protectionism. While the theories all have their value, this analysis 
concentrates on macroeconomic variables in the endogenous protection model as these topics 
lay closer to the national and international contagion of a financial crisis. This part of the 
analysis is also more applicable to the economy as a whole rather than depending on models 
that take a pure cross-industry point of view.  
1.4. Approach  
The following Chapter, 2, starts by developing some important concepts used in this 
dissertation. A theoretical explanation of the endogenous protection model, some critical points 
of view on this theory and a review of empirical findings concerning this topic follow this. 
Chapter 3 explains the methodology, starting with a brief explanation of the research design 
and an explanation of dependent and independent variables to be applied in the analysis. The 
definition and sources used for data collection is explained in Chapter 3.1., followed by a 
theoretical explanation of the HP-filter and of the OLS model used in this dissertation to detect 
causal relationships.  
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Chapter 4 presents the empirical results, with the HP-filtered tariff cycles in chapter 4.1., 
descriptive statistics to the OLS model in chapter 4.2 and the OLS models in chapter 4.3. 
Chapter 5 elaborates upon these findings and a conclusion is presented in chapter 6.  
 
 
5. 
2. Review on determinants affecting protectionism 
The theoretical review at hand begins by defining the working concepts of protectionism and 
financial crisis, followed by a description of the endogenous protection theory. This theory 
can help to understand how macroeconomic variables consistent with variables identified with 
financial crisis (cf. definition of a financial crisis) might influence the average level of 
protectionism in a country.  
This theory also explains why small open economies make use of protectionism. While the 
theory of “economic efficiency” concludes that only large countries benefits from protectionism 
through improved terms of trade, political-economic models conclude that political gains can 
outweigh the economic “non-efficiency” costs. As such, protectionism can be perceived as 
beneficial also for small open economies (Bown, 2014). Since Norway is a small, open 
economy such a theory is well suited for the present study.  
The endogenous protection theory will be evaluated and followed by a literature review of 
empirical findings. These sections will allow for a further understanding of the theory and 
possible development of the present paper’s regression model. 
2.1. Definition of concepts 
Researchers tend to apply different definitions for the concepts of protectionism and financial 
crisis. It is therefore essential to establish which working definitions that will be applied in the 
present study. 
2.1.1. Protectionism: 
Abboushi (2010) defines protectionism as “the sum of government policies intended to assist 
domestic producers against foreign producers in a particular industry, by means of raising the 
price of foreign products, lowering cost for domestic producers, and limiting foreign 
producer’s access to domestic market (Abboushi, 2010, p. 387).” This definition takes an 
industry point of view and assumes that some industries will receive more protection than 
others due to their nature.  
The business dictionary defines protectionism as “governmental policy aimed at shielding a 
fragile economy, or a weak or critical sector, from cheaper or better imports 
(BusinessDictionary, 2014).”  Evident from this definition is that protectionism can account 
for the economy as a whole and not only for specific sectors. 
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The present research intends to look at the overall level of protectionism in the Norwegian 
economy, and not per industry as a sector is assumed to be weak and critical independently of 
a financial crisis. 
Important aspects to grasp from both definitions is that protectionism is a political measure 
and the level of protectionism will not move instantly with instability or stability in the 
market. Protectionism responds to weak and fragile situations and is intended to protect the 
domestic market, whether as a whole or for particular industries, against foreign producers. 
Types of protectionism 
The methods available to shield an economy are many and include duty rates (tariff barriers), 
non-tariff barriers and currency controls (Abboushi, 2010). Currency controls refer to the 
manipulation of exchange rates so that the price of the domestic goods are relatively cheaper 
than the imported goods (ibid). Non-tariff barriers are numerous and contain all methods 
which can increase price or otherwise limit a foreign producer’s access to the market 
(UNCTAD, 2013). Figure 1 illustrates this relationships in a triangle. 
Figure 1 Triangle of trade protectionism 
 
Source: drawing based on definitions  
2.1.2. Financial crisis: 
Different definitions have been used to explain the concept of a financial crisis, and as of 
today there is no universal agreed upon definition. Classifications have been between pure 
currency crisis, capital account crisis and debt and banking crisis. Often such crisis overlap 
(Claessens & Kose, 2013). There have also been crisis that are purely financial without 
extensive effect on the real economy and vice versa (Grytten & Hunnes, 2010). 
Professor Raymond Goldsmith (1982), a leading authority on this topic, defines a financial 
crisis as: “a sharp, brief, ultra-cyclical deterioration of almost all financial indicators, short 
term interest rates, assets (stock, real estate, land) prices, commercial insolvencies and failure 
of financial institutions.“    
Currency Controls
Custom duties
Non-Tariff 
Barriers
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Kindleberger’s Crisis Theory 
Another authority in this field Charles P. Kindleberger, connects a financial crisis to the real 
economy.  He defines a financial crisis by looking at its development through several phases: 
manias, panics and eventually crisis, unless the development is halted before the economy 
reaches a crisis (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2011).  
A financial crisis starts with manias which gather speed through an exogenous chock and the 
expansion of money and credit. This develops further through speculative manias when 
investors start acting irrationally and participates in excessive speculation in markets they 
know are overheated, resulting in euphoria, overtrading and excessive gearing. The mania 
phase will eventually stagnate when more sophisticated investors realize that their 
indebtedness is too large. 
Financial distress follows when more investors rush to sell their stocks and assets and 
financial institutions stop supplying money and credit out of fear of further losses as prices 
continue to drop as demand decreases.  Finally, a tragic meltdown in the real economy 
follows including slowdown in GDP growth and increased unemployment. Financial crisis 
can also spread between countries through monetary channels, trade channels, exchange rates, 
arbitrage (price) and pure psychology (Kindleberger, 1995b).  
Deflationary pressure often spreads internationally through changes in currency values, 
deprecation when currencies are floating and devaluation when currencies are pegged. The 
price level also connects countries through arbitrage, a factor that changes prices in several 
international markets simultaneously ( (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2011). 
Trade in goods can also lead to international contagion through the foreign-trade multiplier, 
resulting in reduced purchase of imports for the crisis-country. In the nature of bilateral trade 
this means that the exports of this country’s trading partner is reduced and thus also the 
national income of that country. This leads into a virtuous cycle as reduced national income of 
the second country will lead back to country one and to other trading partners (Kindleberger, 
1995b).   
From these definitions, a financial crisis refers to, in the present paper, a sharp and significant 
fall in financial indicators, which also leads to a recession deeper than the normal business 
cycles. Financial crisis can be purely national but also international spreading through several 
channels.   
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In accordance with this definition, table 1 presents an overview of financial crisis in Norway 
since 1875. The right side of this table includes the effects on the real economy during the 
respective financial crisis (Grytten & Hunnes, 2010, p. 8) 
Table 1 Financial crisis in Norway since 1875 
Time period Financial crisis 
1875-1888 (1893)* The Long Depression 
1899-1905 Christiania Crisis 
1921-1928 Post-war crisis or pari-crisis 
1930-1933  The Great Depression 
1987-1993  The “Banking” Crisis 
2007- The Great Recession 
 
*People disagree of the end of the Long Depression.  
Source: information attained from Grytten and Hunnes (2010, p.8) 
 
2.2. Theoretical foundation of counter-cyclical protection 
The principal focus of the theory of endogenous protection has been to establish determinants 
of trade policy and the resulting policy mix of protectionism and liberalism. Standard models 
of endogenous protection try to explain protectionism by combining the political environment 
with macroeconomic variables. Variables deducted from these models serve as indicators of 
both the demand of protectionism and of the likelihood of the government to supply 
protectionism (Sherman, 2002). 
The present study concentrates on variables taken from the macroeconomic side of this theory 
and their influence on the demand and supply for protectionism. A macro-market view often 
intends to explain the business cycle hypothesis: “bad times favor protection” (Odell, 1990, p. 
147) and is thus a direct link to the research question at hand. This approach was taken by, 
amongst others, Bohara and Kaempfer (1991) and Dollery and Whitten (1998). To gain a 
thorough understanding of how these macro-variables can affect protectionism it is however 
useful to start with an introduction to the political side of endogenous protection. 
2.2.1. Political characteristics 
Protectionism is assumed to be demanded by broad and specific interests and supplied by 
politicians. The theory denotes protectionism as endogenous because the level of average 
protectionist that is chosen is a result of the demand for protection and not controlled directly 
by the policy makers. Politicians “simply” grant policies and regulations which will maximize 
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their political support (Hansen, 1990). Protectionism is therefore controlled by other 
exogenous variables and is not exogenous in itself.  
Demand and supply for protectionism 
The evolution of early theories in this area have resulted in two main views on how the 
demand for protectionism is formed in an industry: from an interest group (or pressure group) 
point of view and from a median voter point of view (Gawande & Krishna, 2001).  
From the interest group perspective, the level of protection is a result of political pressure from 
groups that lobby the government to adhere to their members’ political interests (Gawande & 
Krishna, 2001). “Lobbying groups compete amongst themselves, all trying to influence the 
politicians the most to maximize their own wealth (Hansen, 1990).” Politicians will choose their 
policy mix in accordance with the strength of the pressure. 
The median voter theory assumes that trade preferences are being voted upon. Due to this the 
politicians will chose such policies that will maximize the number of votes that they can receive. 
Thus, if the median voter in period t favours protectionism then politicians will choose a policy 
mix that does the same (Trefler, 1993).  
Since this paper emphasises on the economic side of this theory it will not favour either 
approach. Both voters and lobby groups offer important insights. The demand for protection is 
therefore assumed to be created by both lobby groups and voters, as in the model of Magee et 
al. (1989). Voters have imperfect information and will be influenced by the ideas and politica l 
campaigns of the specific interest groups (lobbyists) (van den Berg, 1995).  
Pro-protectionist versus anti-protectionist interests 
Most models of endogenous protection make a simplification assuming that interest groups (and 
voters) belong to one of two main categories: those favouring protectionism and those opposing 
it. These two groups will work against each other trying to influence or pressure the politic ians 
to adapt their point of view (Bohara & Kaempfer, 1991). 
Including both lobby groups and voters, protection “is created between the narrow interests of 
protectionist and proexport groups, on the one hand, and the broad interests of voters 
(consumers) on the other hand (Magee and Young in Stern, 1987, p.6).” 
Bohara and Kaempfer (1991) and Bagwell and Staiger (2003) theorize on the role of imports to 
an industry. Interest groups organized in import-competing industries are more likely to be in 
favour of import restrictions, as a measure to protect their own business. Interest groups 
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belonging to industries that depend on imports as intermediaries will prefer cheaper prices on 
imported goods and favour liberalism.  
Looking at the economy as a whole, which is the task of this paper, an economy that largely 
depends on imports, would be less likely to have high levels of import protection, “regardless” 
of other variables. This issue will be further discovered in section 2.2.2. 
Pressure from abroad 
Van den Berg (1995) develops four scenarios on how demand for protectionism affects the 
policy mix. 1-3 is in accordance with the description of demand above and includes (1) 
maximizing votes (2) pressure form lobby groups (3) voters are influenced by politica l 
campaigns and are imperfectly informed.  The forth scenario concerns foreign lobby groups.  
These foreign lobby groups pressure their respective government to increase (decrease) the 
average level of protectionism in their country. If a country increases its tariff rate a partner 
countries will face a welfare loss as part of the cost of the tariff is borne by foreign exporters, 
who sell at a lower price. The gain of the tariff imposer is the equal to the loss of the exporter  
(Bagwell & Staiger, 2003).” 
This loss can trigger a pressure for retaliation from lobby groups in other countries as a way to 
restore their own markets and offset the welfare loss (van den Berg, 1995).  
2.2.2. Economic characteristics 
The theory of endogenous protection assumes further that the ability of interest groups to 
pressure for protectionism depends on fluctuations in general economic conditions. This is one 
of the reasons why protectionism has tended to move in cycles (Sieg, 1997, p. 326). 
When the productivity and wealth of economic activity falls lobbying will be considered as 
more important and the relative value of lobbying increases. “It is seen as less necessary (and 
more costly) to engage in lobbying when the economic conditions are creating favourable 
outcomes. Changes in the demand for protectionism is therefore expected with changing 
economic conditions (Sherman, 2002, p. 10).” 
Magee et al.(1989) stress this relationship and its connection to the endogenous protection 
theory explaining variation in protectionism by : “those exogenous variables that drive the 
behavior of special interests and general interests who favor or oppose protection (Magee, et 
al., 1989, p. 183)”.   
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There are no pre-determined set of macroeconomic variables which are applied to models of 
endogenous protection. In accordance with Sherman (2002), the five most commonly used 
variables are (1) unemployment, (2) GDP growth, (3) the trade balance, (4) inflation, and (5) 
exchange rates. These variables are used in, amongst others, Dollery and Whitten (1998), based 
upon the models of Magee et al. (1989) and Bohara and Kaempfer (1991).  
Unemployment rate 
It is generally assumed in the models of endogenous protection that high unemployment rates 
are positively related to a higher level of average protectionism.  
With a high unemployment rate at home, lobby groups and voters will feel the pressure to lobby 
more intensively for the protection of the domestic jobs from international competition. Such a 
pressure is less intense in periods when the unemployment rate is low (Bohara & Kaempfer, 
1991). 
It is also easier for interest groups to gain public support for protectionism when the 
unemployment rate is high, playing on the image of “unfair competition stealing away domestic 
jobs (Bohara & Kaempfer, 1991, p. 958).” 
GDP per capita growth 
When growth in real GNP or GDP per capita is large, it is presumed that employment, exports 
and profits are increasing. When the economy as a whole is doing well it is assumed that voters 
and lobby groups feel less threatened by foreign competition and therefore they are more likely 
to favour a reduction in tariff levels (Dollery & Whitten, 1998).  
More precisely, when the industrial sector is competitive there is less need for protection, thus 
predicting a negative coefficient in the regression model. When GDP (GNP) growth is slow, it 
assumes worse economic conditions, which will trigger a demand for protectionism. That is, 
decreasing competitiveness would increase the need for protection, (Blattman, et al., 2002).  
Import penetration 
The role of import values are especially important to the theory of endogenous protection. The 
most general opinion is that “higher levels of import penetration will lead to greater 
protectionism (Trefler, 1993, p. 139).” An empirical investigation should show a positive 
coefficient between import penetration as the determinant and protectionism as the dependent 
variable. 
There is still the issue of competition between pro-protectionist and anti-protectionist lobby 
groups and voters as theorized by Bohara and Kaempfer (1991). Increased import penetration 
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might reduce the welfare of industries that compete with imports, while it might increase the 
welfare of industries that depend on imports for their production of goods (Gawande, et al., 
2012).  
However, due to the assumption on the relative cost of lobbying it is more expensive for pro-
import groups to lobby for lower tariff rates when facing higher import penetration. The cost is 
relatively lower for import competing industries and therefore they will pressure harder for 
more protectionism (Sherman, 2002). 
Inflation 
In endogenous protection models by, amongst others, Magee et al. (1989) and Bohara and 
Kaempfer (1991) inflation is theorized to reduce the pressure for protectionism. Higher 
domestic inflation means higher prices at home. From a voter’s perspective this might be 
perceived as a motivation for demanding cheaper imported goods. That is, as a way to lessen 
the inflationary pressure.  
Bohara and Kaempfer (1991, p.953/954) include the possibility that inflation might increase 
the pressure for protection. That is, inflation will reduce competitiveness relatively to other 
countries which in turn will increase imports relatively to exports. This increase in import 
volumes can then trigger a pressure for more protection. Due to this, the pre-assumed coefficient 
can be both positive and negative.  
Exchange rates 
Real appreciation of currency reduces a country’s relative competitiveness and makes imports 
relatively cheaper as compared to domestic substitutes. This can lead to increased protectionism 
pressure in order to improve or maintain domestic producer’s competitiveness (Sherman, 2002). 
That is often the case when the exchange rate is fixed as the country cannot take actions to 
depreciate its currency again.  Fixed exchange rates can contribute to booms and busts as they 
affect the price levels and the balance of payment (Fingerand & Schuknecht, 1999, p. 20).  
Partner country’s protectionist level 
In addition to these most commonly used variables the scenario of foreign lobbying was 
mentioned as a trigger for domestic lobbying. Blattman et al. (2002) theorize that countries will 
impose higher tariffs this year if they face higher tariffs from their main trading partners. A 
positive coefficient is expected (Blattman, et al., 2002).   
Table 2 summaries these explanatory variables and their expected theoretical sign. 
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Table 2 Explanatory variables expected from the theory of endogenous protection , Chapter 2.2.2. 
Expected Signs of the Explanatory Variables 
Variable Expected sign 
Real GDP per capita Negative 
Unemployment rate Positive 
Import penetration Positive 
Inflation rate Positive or negative 
Fixed exchange Rate Positive 
Appreciation of Currency Positive 
Partner country’s protectionist level Positive 
Source: Adapted from Dollery and Whitten (1998, p.217). Exchange rate from Fingerand and 
Schuknecht (1999, p.20). Partner country’s protectionism level from Blattman et al. (2002).  
 
2.3. Evaluation of theory 
The endogenous model of protectionism has been used by many  to understand reasons behind 
protectionism. A critical investigation of this theory will help to understand challenges with the 
present study at hand and give guidance to how these challenges can be solved in the analysis. 
Competition among lobby groups 
The assumption that export industries (anti-protectionist interests) do not react to changes in 
the trade balance or other macro-economic variables due to relative lobby costs (cf. Chapter 
2.2) might be misleading (e.g., Bagwell and Staiger, 2003, and Gawande et al., 2012). 
Due to this, the coefficients assumed in table 2 might take a different direction. If anti-
protectionist groups manage to lobby more efficiently than pro-protectionist groups, then 
macro-economic variables might not increase protectionism as one would have thought 
(Sherman, 2002). As such, a financial crisis is not assumed to increase protectionism to a great 
extent either.  
It has been theorized more recently that, in countries where a vast majority of lobby groups 
depends largely on imports the average level of protectionism will be less likely respond 
positively to changing macro-economic variables (Gawande, et al., 2011). 
Such situations can occur from vertical specialization when countries increasingly specialize in 
inputs, depending on international production sharing. It can also occur when countries 
specialize in different final products, leaving the production of many necessary products to 
other countries (ibid). 
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Might not give the full pictures standing alone 
Odell (1990) claims that a macro-market view has helped to explain the phenomenon of 
protectionism well and has had better explanatory importance than many other used theories. 
However, “taken narrowly or alone this theory is inadequate (Odell, 1990, p. 148).”  
While most theories focus on either one of these perspectives and contribute to a deep 
understanding on that topic, an integrated theoretical model including several factors would 
give a more holistic picture of protectionism. It would also help to better understand the causal 
effect of the macro-economic variables (ibid).  
In particular, what is absent from the endogenous protection theories is the role of internationa l 
institutions and multilateral trade negotiations, such as the GATT and the WTO. Their absence 
from the theory is noteworthy since their role has been to directly control and limit the use of 
protectionism between its contract parties. If a country is true to its obligations under the 
international trade negotiations, they are more likely to respond to the negotiated levels of 
protection and the tariff levels of their main negotiation partners.  
The GATT and similar multilateral institutions have not eliminated or given less value to the 
explanation of pressure for protectionism. It has however given support and motivation for anti-
protectionist groups to lobby against pro-protections lobby groups. A response in protectionism 
(or liberalism) to domestic political and economic variables are therefore assumed to be more 
limited in today’s world than as assumed through the original endogenous tariff models 
(Sherman, 2002). See appendix 1 for an overview over relevant rules and regulations within 
these institutions 
2.4. Research front on protectionism and business cycles 
An extensive amount of empirical work have intended to investigate one or more of the 
theoretical explanatory variables in the partial endogenous protection model and the hypothes is 
of counter-cyclical protectionist levels. Empirical research seem to be split between find ings 
before the 2000s and findings in regards to the Great Recession.  
2.4.1. Business cycles and protectionism 
It has been a general acknowledgement among most researchers that the average level of 
protectionism is pro-cyclical to recessions (e.g., McKeown, 1984, Gallarotti, 1985, Grilli, 1988, 
Feinberg, 1989, Bohara and Kaempfer, 1991). A more recent study from Bagwell and Staiger 
(2003) found that protectionism tended to move countercyclically to national business cycles.  
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Research on the current financial crisis are however contradicting, some studies show that 
“protectionism isn’t countercyclical anymore” (Rosé, 2012)” or that that there has not been a 
surge in protectionism since the onset of the crisis (e.g. Gewande et al., 2011) while other 
studies find opposite results (e.g., Evenett et al., 2010).  
2.4.2. Empirically testing the endogenous tariff model 
Baldwin (1985) conducted early empirical research on the endogenous protection model. He 
tested the impact of import changes, unemployment and GDP on the organization of politica l 
pressure groups. From this, Baldwin found that a country’s output and employment growth 
rates were negatively related to the level of protectionism. These findings cohere with the 
theoretical expectations of the partial endogenous protection model.  The coefficient of import 
penetration was positive as expected from the theory.  
In addition to these findings, Baldwin (1985) also concluded that the macro-economic variables 
included in his model had higher explanatory evidence than political variables. The latter were 
insignificant. 
Another early research conducted by Olson (1983) found that changes in a country’s income 
level and changes in the employment rate are the most likely variables to trigger a response 
from pressure groups. Magee and Young (1987) in Stern (1987) find that two third of the 
changes in US tariffs could be explained by their model.  
Taking insights from the Magee et al. (1989) model, Bohara and Kaempfer (1991) find that (for 
the USA) changes in the unemployment rate and change in the inflation rate had the largest 
explanatory effect on changes in average tariff levels, fostering higher tariffs and lower tariffs 
respectively.  
Trefler’s (1993) empirical research found that changes in import penetration had high 
explanatory power. His research provides further evidence for the endogenous model as high 
unemployment rates also lead to more protection. Further, changes in import penetration rates 
were five times as important for explaining the dependent variable as concentration rate and 
number of firms in an industry, which are political variables. 
Hoe and Chung (2008) applied the partial endogenous protection theory to the case of South 
Korea, another small economy, and found that import penetration had the most important 
impact on the level of protectionism confirming a positive coefficient. Change in import 
penetration however showed a negative coefficient.  
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Researching the significance of lobby groups for the final policy outcome, Gawande et al. 
(2012) confirm that lobby competition has a high explanatory significance of the U.S.’s 
variation in protectionism versus liberalism.  
Import penetration and protectionism: a negative coefficient? 
Bagwell and Staiger’s (2003) findings partly agree with Trefler (1993) and the endogenous 
protection model in the sense that transitory increases in import penetration increased the level 
of protectionism.  
An interesting result however is that they found a negative relationship between import 
penetration and protection when trade volume growths were positively correlated over time. In 
such a case, protectionism moves counter-cyclically to movements in import volumes, 
decreasing when the economy is in a boom phase with increasing imports and increasing when 
trade volumes decline. They concluded with this a connection between international business 
cycles and protectionism. 
Gawande et al. (2011)’s empirical research confirms their theorem (c.f. Chapter 2.3.). They 
find that today’s relatively low tariff levels could be explained by increased trade and 
dependency between countries. This supports the theory that countries that depend largely on 
imports resorts less to trade protectionism.  
Fixed exchange rate and currency depreciation 
A recent study by Bown and Crowley (2012) find like previous research that domestic 
unemployment rates increased the average level of protectionism, before 2008. They find 
further that the factors affecting protectionism changed after the onset of the Great Recession 
and that the exchange rate now explained the lack of change in tariffs and NTBs. That is, they 
found evidence of extensive depreciation of national currencies as a response to the recession, 
rather than increases in other import protection methods. 
Keeping in mind that the triangle of protectionism also includes currency controls, as many 
countries including Norway used fixed rates before the 2000s it is logical that depreciation of 
national currency first saw a surge during the most current financial crisis.  
Eichengreen and Irwin (2009) found similar results in their study on the Great Depression. They 
proved empirically that countries staying on the gold standard ended up protecting their 
economy with tariffs to a larger extent than countries that left the gold standard early. Countries 
that left the gold standard early such as the UK and Scandinavian countries were found to 
depreciate their exchange rate to adjust for their reduced competitiveness.   
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Retaliation  
Blattman et al. (2002) found, as other studies on exogenous macroeconomic factors, that the 
growth of GDP per capita was one of the most important variables, which explained why some 
countries had higher levels of protectionism than others, in the 20 th century.  
However, when including retaliation as an explanatory variable Blattman et al. (2002) found 
that changes in trading partner’s tariffs were by far most important variable that could explain 
the changes in a country’s tariffs in the 20th century. That is, as compared to GDP per capita 
and other macroeconomic variables.  
Interesting findings by Boffa and Olarrega (2012) contradict the past evidence of retaliation for 
the current Great Recession. They found no evidence of retaliation, instead it appeared that 
countries reduced their level of protectionism in response to an increase in a trading partner’s 
level of protectionism.  
Davis and Pecl (2012) find similar empirical results. During the last decade, countries were 
more likely to increase their level of protectionism when the recession was isolated and purely 
national than when the recession was more international in nature. These results from the 21th 
century are important contradictions to findings in the 20th century. 
International institutions 
Sherman (2002) conducted further research on the endogenous protection model since the 
1950s and found that interest groups do not respond as assumed to the macroeconomic variables 
in the model. Instead, the average tariff level is adjusted in cooperation with the levels of their 
main negotiations partners, through the international processes and institutions such as the 
GATT. 
Several recent studies, which have tried to understand why the current financial crisis has seen 
less of a surge in protectionism than expected, also find empirical evidence from internationa l 
institutions such as GATT and the WTO. These institutions have been found to reduce today’s 
level of protectionism and to reduce the potential of retaliation between countries (e.g., Bown, 
2004, Gawande et al, 2011, Evenett et al., 2010).   
Table 3 summaries this empirical literature review. 
Table 3 Summary of empirical literature review 
Authors Coverage Measure Research topic and results Method 
Boffa and 
Olarreaga 
(2012) 
November 2008-
December 2010 
Countries in database 
Global trade 
Alert database 
(GTA) 
Retaliation between trading partners. Found a 
negative relationship rather than proof or 
retaliation. 
Logit model, 
regression 
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Bown and 
Crowley 
(2012) 
1988Q1-2008:Q4 and 
2008:Q4-2010:Q4 
 
The USA and the EU 
Temporary 
trade barriers, 
technical 
barriers to 
trade 
Macroeconomic determinants of 
protectionism. Domestic and foreign 
unemployment and real appreciation in 
bilateral exchange rate most important before 
2008. Little significance after 2008 
Regression 
model 
Davis and 
Pelc (2012) 
1997-2009 
 
 
Tariff rates 
and remedy 
investigations 
Testing retaliation during a crisis. Countries 
impose less protectionism when the crisis is 
international than national 
Logistic 
Regression 
model 
Rose, 
Adrew K 
(2012) 
30 years 
60 countries 
18 measures Relationship between tariffs and NTBs and 
cyclical downturns. Protectionism found to 
be acyclical not countercyclical 
Regression 
model 
Gawande et 
al. (2011) 
Pre and Post Great 
2007 
Most Favored 
Nations 
(MFN) tariffs 
and bilateral 
tariffs 
Determinants of protectionism. Likelihood of 
increased protectionism today found to be 
low due to an increase in the importance of 
imports and international institutions.  
Logistic 
Regression 
model 
Eichengreen 
and Irwin 
(2009) 
Early 1930s 
Countries in the gold 
block, sterling block 
and depreciation 
countries 
Import Tariffs 
and import 
quotas 
Comparing protectionism in different 
countries during the Great Depression. 
Countries staying on the gold standard found 
to be protecting the most 
Empirical 
comparison of 
protectionism 
Heo and 
Chung 
(2008) 
Year 2000 
South Korea 
Annual 
average tariffs 
equivalents 
(AVE) 
The endogenous tariff model in Korea. 
Import penetration has a positive 
(insignificant) coefficient. Changes in import 
penetration the opposite. 
Regression 
analysis 
including 
2SLS 
Bagwell and 
Staiger 
(2003) 
Two countries model Unilateral 
tariffs 
Counter cyclicality of tariffs and business 
cycles. Confirmed such a relationship 
through the trade balance. 
Own designed 
model 
Blattman et 
al. (2002) 
1870-1938 
35 countries, not 
Norway. 
Natural log of 
own tariff 
To understand which countries protected, and 
why. Changes in trading partners’ tariffs was 
the most important determinant followed by 
GDPc 
Regression 
analysis 
Sherman, 
Richard 
(2002) 
1953-1994 
United States, Japan, 
and the EU 
Tariffs Testing the relationship between the 
endogenous protection theory and trade 
negotiations. The latter had a higher 
explanatory power. 
Econometric, 
regression 
analysis 
Dollery and 
Whitten 
(1998) 
1903-1974 
Australia 
Average 
levels of 
tariffs 
Endogenous protection model. Find the 
model to have high explanatory power in 
Australia 
Vector 
Autoregressive 
model 
Trefler 
(1993) 
1993 
United States 
Several NTB 
in 
manufacturing 
Testing the endogenous protection model. 
Find that import penetration has the highest 
explanatory power. 
Regression 
analysis, also 
2SLS 
Bohara and 
Kaempfer 
(1991) 
1870-1970 
United States 
Average tariff 
levels 
Macroeconomic determinants behind 
protectionism.  
Vector 
Autoregressive 
model 
Magee and 
Young 
(1987) 
1900-1984 
The United States 
Average tariff 
levels and AD 
statutes 
Endogenous protection model. 2/3 of the 
changes in the average tariff could be 
explained by the model. 
 
Baldwin 
(1985) 
Tokyo Round 
United States 
Tariff data Endogenous protection model. Found 
support for output and employment growth 
rates and import penetration rates 
Regression 
models 
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3. Methodology: 
This dissertation takes a deductive approach using determinants from an established theory to 
investigate the explanatory value of a financial crisis on the average level of protectionism in 
Norway. Data are collected from public Norwegian statistical sources and reach back to 1866.. 
These approaches are explained  more in detail to lay the foundation for the research model and 
to argue for the validity and reliability of the data collection and methods.  
3.1. Research design and determinants 
The nature of this dissertation is to understand not only how, but why, a financial crisis affects 
Norwegian protectionism. Investigating these two questions, an exploratory-explana tory 
approach will be taken. Exploratory, the cycle values of protectionism in normal times versus 
during the pre-determined financial crisis will give an overview on how protectionism responds 
to a financial crisis without including the trend effect. 
Since there are already established theories on determinants behind protectionism, this study 
takes a deductive approach drawing from the theory on endogenous protection. With this 
theory, a set of macroeconomic determinants has been established that will serve as independent 
variables in an explanatory research model, with the average level of protectionism as the 
dependent variable. The essence is to detect a causal relationship between the determinants and 
the dependent variable.  
The macroeconomic determinants from the theory of endogenous protection are linked to the 
development of a financial crisis. That is, a financial crisis (often) reduces GDP, inflation and 
world trade, while it increases the unemployment rate. These macroeconomic variables will 
therefore serve as mediators between a financial crisis and the average level of protectionism. 
3.1.1. Norway as a typical example of a small, open, economy 
The analysis will be conducted on Norway as a (non-probability) typical case for a small open 
economy. Empirical research have been asked for small open economies and this dissertation 
is a partial response to that demand. Norway is chosen as an illustration and the results are not 
meant to be definitive. The focus is not on external validity but on understanding the situation 
in Norway. Still, as a small open economy the results of the analysis, compared to literature 
review conducted on large and powerful countries, might give some valuable predictions for 
how other small open economies respond to protectionism. 
3.1.2. Time series regression through an archival research approach 
Instead of restricting this research to the current financial crisis or any other financial crisis 
alone, a sample of tariff custom duties reaching back to 1866 will be used to create a 
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longitudinal research model tested with time series regression.  This time span makes it possible 
to include empirical evidence from 5 international financial crisis and one purely nationa l 
financial crisis: the Long Depression (1875-1888(93)), the Christiania crisis which had “only” 
a national reach (1899-1905), the pari-Crisis or after-war crisis (1921-1928), the Great 
Depression (1930-1933), the Banking Crisis (1987-1993) and the Great Recession (2007-).  
Time-series analysis is useful as the theory of endogenous protection presumes that the strength 
and opinions of the different interest groups will vary over time and in accordance with 
changing economic conditions.  
Due to the nature of longitudinal time series and the attempt to detect causal relationships, the 
data collection concentrates on secondary and quantitative data. To collect these data, this 
dissertation follows an archival research method, gathering data from official Norwegian 
registers, in particular from Central Bureau of Statistics of Norway (SSB) and the Norwegian 
Central bank. They report original collected raw data, which are collected in accordance with 
the public decided definitions.   
3.1.3. Dependent variable 
This research follows Roderíguez and Rodrik (2000) and Irwin (2010) and applies ad-valorem 
equivalents (AVE) as the best available method to measure trade restrictiveness on historica l 
data. This method was chosen for Norway due to data availability from the mid-19th century 
until today. NTB’s or calculations of efficient tariff rates are not available for a long time -
period, most NTB’s being documented only since the 1980s.  
The variables needed to calculate AVE can be seen from equation 1 (NAPC-TPD, 2009) 
(1)     𝐴𝑉𝐸 =
𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚  𝐷𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠′  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠
∗ 100 
3.1.4. Determinants 
The determinants deducted from the endogenous protection theory serves as determinants in 
the present dissertation. To test the causality of a financial crisis, a dummy variable is added to 
the model indicating when there is a financial crisis. Understanding the importance of 
international institutions a dummy variable representing the introduction of GATT (=1) is also 
included. Table 4 summarises the independent variables used in this study and their expected 
sign (as from the original endogenous models). Additional variables will be added to the model 
to understand the validity of the variables in table 4.  
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Table 4 Determinants that will be used in the time series regression model  
Dependent variable:  
AVE  
 
Determinants Expected sign 
Endogenous Protection Model 
Real GDP per capita Negative 
Unemployment rate Positive 
Import penetration Positive  
Inflation rate Positive or negative 
Fixed Exchange Rate (dummy) Positive 
Exchange rate (NOK/foreign) Negative 
Trading partner’s level of protectionism Positive 
Control or Alternative Variables 
Membership in GATT (dummy)  Negative 
Financial crisis (dummy) Positive 
Source: deducted from the theory of endogenous protection and empirical literature review (c.f. 
Chapter 2.2 - 2.4) 
3.2. Data collection: 
SSB as the official statistical bureau in Norway will be actively used in obtaining the time series 
for Norwegian trade data. SSB has collected data on various topics since the 19 th century, 
including custom duties and import values (in kroner) needed to construct average AVEs.  
These data can be collected from SSB’s “Statistical Yearbook of Norway.” These data are 
reported in the table “Imports and Exports” or “Aperçu général de l’Importation et de 
l’Exportation” depending on secondary language used in the report. The table number depends 
on the report at hand. 
These books have been digitalized by SSB and are available for download SSB.no (2014). This 
study collects data from 1866 until 2013 going through all the individual yearbooks, transferr ing 
the raw data into an excel file. Avoiding typing in the wrong numbers from the PDF-files to the 
excel file, this process has to be done thorough and carefully and validated repeatedly.  
SSB receives data from the national Customs Authorities that follows the recommendations 
from the United Nations Statistical commission for collection of data. Post 1958 import data 
includes all goods imported into the country for direct use, as well as goods stored in credit 
warehouses and goods from transit warehouses, that is, custom cleared goods (SSB, 1978).  
Between 1939 and 1958, a system of special trade as compared to general trade was used for 
collecting trade data. The difference has to do with which data passes the bonded warehouses, 
special trade referring to goods only for consumption. In accordance with SSB, the effect of 
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this change is insignificant and should not affect the comparison of figures over time (SSB, 
1978, p. 255).  
The classification of commodity groups have also changed over the years, changing with 
international classifications such as the Standard International Trade Classifications (SITC) 
introduced in 1953. This thesis concentrates on the average AVE rate and is not concerned with 
different commodity groups.  
The Norwegian Central Bank is the other main source for data collection. The project 
“Historical Monetary Statistics of Norway” has worked on gathering data for historica l 
Norwegian GDP, inflation, exchange rates, monetary volumes and more.  
The definition of unemployment has varied during the time span. Mitchell (2003) has collected 
unemployment ratios for various countries including Norway reaching back to 1904. In his time 
series, two different definitions are used- The first one from 1904-1971 includes unemployment 
among trade unionists and the other from 1971 includes a full coverage or registered 
unemployed and unregistered discovered through a survey. The definition used was adjusted in 
accordance to data availability, and is assumed to be the best possible available coverage.  
Table 5 gives an overview over definitions used in this study and their respective source where 
the same data can be found.   
Table 5 Definitions, information and sources used to collect data for dependent and 
independent variables and control variables used in this study 
Variable Definition, information and sources  
Ad-valorem 
equivalent 
(AVE) 
DEFINITION:  
Custom revenues divided by value of total imports, at current prices. 
 
SOURCES:  
SSB statistical yearbook from 1880 to 2013 for both custom revenues and import 
values in NOK. Tables: “Net Expenditure and Tax Revenue of the Central 
Government” and “Imports and Exports” respectively 
Pdf-files can be downloaded from (SSB.no, 2014) 
Producer 
Support 
Estimate 
(PSE) 
 
DEFINITION 
PSE: “the annual monetary value of gross transfers from consumers and taxpayers 
to agricultural producers, measured at the farm-gate level, arising from policy 
measures that support agriculture, regardless of their nature, objectives or impacts 
on farm production or income (OECD, 2009, p. 19)” 
 
SOURCE: 
OECD.Stat (2013). PSE Database for Norway 
Real GDP per 
capita 
DEFINITION: 
Gross domestic product for Norway, by expenditure in fixed prices (2005-NOK)  
 
SOURCE: 
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Grytten, O.H (2004) 
Unemployment 
rate 
 
DEFINITION: 
1904-1971: Trade unionist unemployed 
1972-2009: Total unemployment coverage from sample survey (labour force 
survey) and registered unemployment figures. Persons aged 16 to 74 years pre-
2006 and 15-74 from 2006 
All figures are average of monthly observations 
 
2009-2012: Annual total unemployment rate, OECD Annual Projections 
 
SOURCES: 
1904-1972: Mitchell, B.R (2003)   
2009-2012: OECD.Stat (2014) 
(Real) Import 
penetration  
 
DEFINITION: 
Ratio between the value of imports (IM) as a percentage of total domestic demand. 
Total domestic demand is calculated as GDP-exports + imports (OECD.Stat, 
2005). 
GDP, Imports and Exports are values in 2005-Norwegian Kroners 
 
SOURCES: 
GDP, Import and Export: Grytten O.H (2004b) 
Inflation  
DEFINITION: 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Norway, annual figures, from 1516 (1998=100) 
 
SOURCE: 
Grytten, O.H (2004a).  
“Figures from 1960 correspond to Statistics Norway’s data for the consumer price 
index (Grytten, 2004a)” 
Partner’s tariff 
(USA) 
DEFINITION: 
Ratio of Collected Custom Duties to the Value of U.S. Imports for Consumption. 
Customs on all imports. 
 
SOURCE: 
U. S. Department of Commerce (2011) 
Financial 
Crisis Dummy 
 
DEFINITION: 
= 1 if there is a financial crisis, 0 otherwise 
 
SOURCE:  
Grytten, O.H and Hunnes, A. (2010) 
Exchange Rate 
Dummy 
 
DEFINITION: 
= 1 if there is a fixed rate, 0 otherwise 
Norway’s exchange rate was mostly fixed until 2001 
 
SOURCE: 
Eitrheim (2012) from the Norwegian Central Bank. Lecture at the Norwegian 
School of Economics. 
Membership in 
institution 
 
DEFINITION: 
=1 if Norway is a member of GATT, 0 otherwise 
 
Norway ratified the GATT agreement on the 10th of July 1948- 
SOURCE: WTO (2013) 
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3.3. Data analysis: 
The how question will be solved by investigating filtered values of Norwegian AVE rates 
between 1866 and 2012. The why question will be solved with time series regression models. 
3.3.1. How does a financial crisis affect the level of protectionism in Norway? 
As a first step, the measures of protectionism will be investigated applying the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter (HP-filter). This technique will allow us to, roughly, visualize whether there is a 
simultaneity of occurrence of a financial crisis and peaks or downturns in the HP filtered series 
of protectionism.  
A HP-filter makes time series stationary and separates the observed protectionism time series 
into a trend component, tt, and a cyclical component, ct, as can be seen in equation (2) 
(2)     𝑦𝑡 = 𝑡𝑐 + 𝑐𝑡   
The cyclical component can be seen as a measure of the business cycle. To separate the business 
cycle effect from the observed values, the trend component can be deducted from the observed 
values using the log formula in equation (3): 
(3)    𝑐𝑡 = log 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑡𝑡 
Visible in a graph, the trend will be stationary and the cyclical component will fluctuate around 
the trend value making visible when there were or if there were large deviations from trend. To 
make the trend stationary, the HP filter smoothens the trend component using a chosen 
smoothing parameter, λ. Equation (4) shows this: 
(4)     𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∑ 𝑐𝑡
2 + 𝜆 ∑ ((𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑡𝑡) − (
𝑚−1
𝑡=2
𝑚
𝑡=1 𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡−1))
2 
In equation (4) m is the sample size. The smoothing parameter decides how smooth the trend 
will be made and thus how clear the cycle effect fluctuating around the trend will be. A larger 
λ makes the trend smoother. The standard λ-value for annual data is 100 (e.g., Backus & Kehoe, 
1992, Grytten and Hunnes, 2010). Others suggest using the λ-value of 400 (e.g., Cooley & 
Ohanian, 1991, & Correia et al, 1992).   
One problem often associated with the HP-filter is the end-point errors where the trend and 
cycle effect disappears at the end of the time series. A way to solve this problem is by increasing 
the smoothing variable. Grytten and Hunnes (2010) use a λ-value of 2.500 on Norwegian GDP-
values to make the trend smother and the cycles clearer.  The present study will use the larger 
λ-values when an end-point problem is evident in the protectionist time series. 
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The how question will in addition to empirical cycle values include some qualitative elaboration 
upon the causes of the particular financial crisis. This will help to gain a deeper understand ing 
of the topic and to elaborate upon the empirical findings. 
3.3.2. Why? A model of average protectionism in Norway 
Multilateral regression analysis with the ordinary least squares method (OLS) is used to 
estimate the determinants described in table 4.   
Adjusting the time series data 
A problem with fitting economic time series with the OLS method is that the original unadjusted 
data often are far from stationary. The data often also has to be adjusted to fit the OSL 
requirements of normal distribution. Applying the HP-filtered values in the OLS model is a 
way of solving this stationary problem. In that model, change in deviations from trend are used 
as the determinants and as the dependent variable. 
Time series can also be made stationary by first differencing the data as it calculates the relative 
changes rather than absolute changes in the data. Taking the natural logarithm (log) of the data 
is often used in time series to normalize the data. The first difference of logharitmic data 
represents a percentage change. This adjustment was taken by Dollary and Whitten (1998) on 
all the data for Australia and in Bohara and Kaempfer (1991).  
In this dissertation, residual plots will be analysed to find the right mix of logarithmic and 
differenced values to fit a good OLS model. Knowing that protectionism is a political variable 
it might not respond immediately to changes in macroeconomic variables. The determinants 
will therefore be tested for an appropriate lag structure.  
An OLS model is only good if all the determinants are exogenous. If the Norwegian AVE rate 
also affects the assumed independent variables the coefficients in the model might be biased.  
Following Bohara and Kaempfer (1991), table 6 shows hypothesis to test the effect of AVE on 
the determinants. The hypothesis will be tested by granger causality estimated by OLS.  
Table 6 Testing the effect of AVEt-1 on determinants in the regression model 
H1:          Norwegian AVE rates do not cause changes in the level of real GDP per capita 
H2 Norwegian AVE rates do not cause changes in the level of unemployment 
H3:          Norwegian AVE rates do not cause changes in the level of import penetration 
H4:          Norwegian AVE rates do not cause changes in the CPI level 
H5: Norwegian AVE rates do not cause changes in the U.S. AVE rates 
 
Adapted from Bohara and Kaempfer (1991, p.956) 
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OSL Models 
Model (i) serves as the initial model measuring the relationship between the chosen 
determinants and the average level of protectionism:  
(i)   𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽′𝑥𝑡 + 𝛿11{𝐹𝐶} + 𝛿21{𝐸𝑋𝐶} + 𝜀𝑡  
where  𝛽′𝑥𝑡 is a function that sums up all the determinants, xt, from table x with their 
regression coefficient, 𝛽. 𝛿11{𝐹𝐶} represents a dummy variable with the coefficient 𝛿1 for the 
presence or not of a financial crisis and 𝛿21{𝐸𝑋𝐶} is a dummy variable with the coefficient to 
account for the currency imperium in Norway: 
𝛿11{𝐹𝐶} = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠
 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                      
  
𝛿21{𝐸𝑋𝐶} = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑖𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                      
 
Although the chosen macroeconomic variables are assumed to increase during a financial crisis 
(c.f. definition of a financial crisis), changes in these variables can occur independently of a 
financial crisis. To investigate if the determinants are significant when there is a financial crisis, 
each determinant will be multiplied by the financial crisis dummy. The variable 𝛿1′ ∗ 1{𝐹𝐶}𝑥𝑡 
in model (ii) shows that each determinant, xt, will be multiplied by 1(FC) revealing the 
coefficient 𝛿. 
(ii)   𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽′𝑥𝑡 + 𝛿′ ∗ 1{𝐹𝐶}𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡          
As such, it is possible to see how the determinants affect the average level of protectionism 
when in fact there was a financial crisis in Norway. This will give a better understanding of 
the causality of the relationship between a financial crisis and protectionism.  
The significance of joining the GATT will be tested, adding a dummy variable in model (iii) 
(iii)    𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽′𝑥𝑡 + 𝛿11{𝐹𝐶} + 𝛿21{𝐸𝑋𝐶} + 𝛿31{𝐺𝐴𝑇𝑇}𝜀𝑡 
 
The GATT dummy indicates the year for when Norway joined the GATT: 
   𝛿31{𝐺𝐴𝑇𝑇} = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑎 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝐴𝑇𝑇         
 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                      
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4. Empirical results 
The following Chapter addresses the two objectives: how and why a financial crisis affects 
the level of average protectionism in Norway.  
4.1. How: financial crisis and mapping of protectionist cycles  
Figure 2 (SSB.no, 2014) shows cycle deviations of Norwegian AVE for the years 1866 to 2012 
as deviations from HP-filtered trend (from now just called trend). It is evident that the highest 
positive deviations from trend and the development leading to these surges often cohere we ll 
with the development of the Norwegian financial crisis as pre-defined in table 1.  
Surges are observable in 1886, 1908-10, 1922 and 1926, 1933-34 and 1939, and 1995. There is 
also a sharp positive deviation from trend in 1944-45 but it is short lasting and is followed 
quickly by a negative deviation. Negative deviations are observable preceding these surges, in 
particular in the years between 1915 and 1922. These observations show signs of a counter -
cyclical relationship between protectionism and a financial crisis.  
The relationship is not perfect. The results from figure 2 show a positive deviation from trend 
during the late 1950s to the mid-1960s.  This shows that variables other than a financial crisis 
affect the average level of protectionism. In this particular case, the Norwegian authorit ies 
replaced many specific tariffs with ad valorem tariffs as part of an update of the Norwegian 
tariff system. This change increased the custom duties (SSB, 1965).  
There is also a discrepancy between the cycle with a smoothing parameter of 100 and that of 
2500 in the years preceding the banking crisis. While, by making the trend line smoother, it is 
possible to discover a negative deviation from trend the cycle with a lambda of 100 shows a 
positive deviation.  
Since Norway has often applied specific tariffs rather than ad valorem tariffs, it is likely that 
the calculated AVE rates have moved with inflation. That is, as the specific tariff remains 
constant while the import value in kroners will move with inflation. To investigate this 
possibility, cycle deviations from trend of a deflated Norwegian AVE rate (following Lehmann 
and O’Rourke, 2011) is added in appendix 2. The cycles follow the same pattern as in figure 2. 
The following Section elaborates upon the different financial crisis in Norway. It will serve as 
an indicator to help understand the causal relationship between a financia l crisis and 
protectionism in Norway.  
 
 
 
28. 
Figure 2 Norwegian AVE gaps as cycle deviations from HP-filtered trend 1866-2012 
 
Source: SSB (1880-2013), Norwegian Statistical Yearbook from 1880-2013, in tables: “Imports and 
Exports.” Pdf-files covering all years are available from SSB.no (2014).  
 
The Long Depression (1875-1888/93) and the Christiania Crisis (1899-1905) 
The actual AVE rates in table 7 indicate that the Long Depression triggered a surge in 
protectionism in Norway. Between the onset of the Crisis and the peak in AVE in 1875 the 
average AVE rate increased by 4.5 percentage points.  
Table 7 Norwegian AVE rates for selected years between 1875 and 1905 
Year AVE  
1875 8.80% 
1878 11.0% 
1881 8.90% 
1886 13.3% 
1891 9.4% 
1898 11.8% 
1901 12.2% 
1905 10.8% 
 
Source: SSB (1880-1906), Norwegian Statistical Yearbook from 1880-1906, in tables: “Imports and 
Exports.” Pdf-files covering all years are available from SSB.no (2014).  
 
From figure 2 a negative deviation from trend is observable before the Long Depression, with 
the lowest point in 1873. The Long Depression was, as the name reveals, long but not 
particularly deep. The downturn was not consistent. Instead, there was a series of setbacks, 
peaking at the end of the 1870s, the beginning and end of the 1880s and early in the 1890s 
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(Grytten & Hunnes, 2010). These dates cohere well with the cycles of protectionism as seen in 
figure 2.  
The AVE rates declined (as compared to trend) before the Long Depression was over and did 
not rise again as a result of the new setback in the early 1890s. This tells the story of a positive 
relationship between a financial crisis and protectionism although the relationship is not perfect.   
The role of the currency is assumed, in the endogenous protection model, to play a role in 
determining the average level of protectionism in a country. During this period, Norway 
significantly changed its monetary policy. Norway changed its reference system from silver to 
gold in 1874. As several other countries took the same approach the value of the silver 
depreciated and Norway got less gold for its silver (ibid).  
Secondly, the quotient system used in Norway required banks to hold at all times 40 % of total 
credit as metal reserves. Mixed with the lower level of gold in the economy, as compared to the 
previous amount of silver, less credit could be supplied to the consumers. The government had 
to require high interest rates to keep the demand for money low (ibid). 
The AVE rate started increasing from 1874, although it stays below trend until a few years later. 
This increase is visible in figure 2. Appendix 3, with the actual AVE rate and the trend line 
from which the cycle deviation is calculated, shows this even clearer. The quotient system was 
replaced by the difference system in 1892 allowing for more money to be issued. From that 
time on and until the end of the 19th century the AVE stayed below the trend line. Still, the AVE 
rate reached below the trend line already in 1890.  
For the preceding financial crisis, the Christiania Crisis, no particular cycle-pattern appear to 
be evident. Figure 2 shows a small positive deviation from trend in 1901. However, the AVE 
rate increases and decreases as compared to trend almost annually during the Crisis. That is 
visible from the small tags in figure 2. The actual AVE rate, from table 7 above, saw a decrease 
of 0.7 percentage point between the onset of the Christiania Crisis in 1899 and the end in 1905.  
The After-War Crisis (1921-1928) and the Great Depression (1930-1933) 
After the First World War, Norway aimed at a liberal trade policy with low tariff rates. After 
several years of war these countries were in need of imports to satisfy the increasing demand 
for goods. They largely depended on imports from the USA (Grytten, 2002).  
Drawing on evidence from empirical results, table 8 shows that the average tariff rate in Norway 
was as low as 3.39% in 1920. The negative deviation of AVE rate from its trend is clearly 
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visible in figure 2 above. This development came to a halt at the beginning of the 1920s and 
tariff rates started to deviate positively from trend. The average level of protectionism in 
Norway intensified significantly during the inter-war years, with an increase of 12.19 
percentage points between 1920 and 1933. See table 8. 
Table 8 Norwegian AVE rates for selected years 
Year AVE (custom duty) 
1913 9.24% 
1920 3.39% 
1922 5.80% 
1924 8.10% 
1927 11.92% 
1930 10.65% 
1933 15.58% 
Source: SSB (1914-1934), Norwegian Statistical Yearbook from 1914-1934, in tables: “Imports and 
Exports.” Pdf-files covering all years are available from SSB.no (2014).  
The depression was particularly severe in Norway and the severity was sustained by a deliberate 
pro-cyclical monetary policy. In 1921, the Norwegian government attempted to reach the pre-
war par value of gold, following the lead of its important trading partner the UK. For the 
Norwegian Kroner to reach this par value it had to appreciate significantly, leading to longer 
periods of deflationary policy (Grytten & Hunnes, 2010).  
Table 9 shows the exchange rate of the Norwegian Kroner in percent of its par value. In 1926, 
the exchange rate reached above the 80 % level and continued to appreciate until the 1930s.  
This policy was partly given up in the 1930s, as a response to the intensified depression, and 
the Norwegian Kroner was allowed to depreciate. Table 9 shows this sharp depreciation as 
compared to the par value between 1930 and 1932. 
Table 9 Exchange Rate of the Norwegian Kroner in Percent of the Par value (=100) 
Year Exchange rate in percent of par value, annual 
averages 
19201 61.7 
19211 55.6 
19262 83.3 
19273 97.2 
19283 99.6 
19294 99.56 
19304 99.85 
19325 67.18 
Source: SSB (1923-1933), Statistical Yearbook for Norway between 1923 and 1933.  
 1(year 1923, p.274) 2(year 1926-1927, p.236) 3(year 1929, p.256) 4(year 1931, p.270) 5(year 1933, 
p.251)  
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The onset of the Great Depression gave rise to a wave of protectionism internationally. This 
surge in trade protectionism was used as an example to warn countries during the Great 
Recession to resist a similar turn in trade policy. Norway followed this trend in the 1930s. In 
addition to allowing for a sharp currency depreciation, the Norwegian tariff rate was raised 
significantly over a few years. Between 1930 and 1933 alone it augmented by almost 5 
percentage points (4.93%, cf. table 8). This positive deviation is evident in figure 3, indicat ing 
the largest deviation from trend during the years 1915 and 1959.  
 
Figure 3 Norwegian AVE rates between 1915 and 1960 and HP-trend for λ100 and λ2500 
 
 
Source: SSB (1916-1961), Norwegian Statistical Yearbook from 1916-1961, in tables: “Imports and 
Exports.” Pdf-files covering all years are available from SSB.no (2014) 
 
The pressure for protectionism in Norway was fortified by a semi-public campaign promoting 
the sales of Norwegian products. The slogan read: “Buy Norwegian”.  This appeal was 
published in all Norwegian newspapers in 1931 and included signatures by numerous important 
personalities in Norway, including the rector at the University of Oslo, the director of the 
Central bank and 25 nation-wide organizations.  This lobbying towards protectionism gained 
political support and was signed by the prime minister and the president of the parliament 
(Grytten, 2002). 
Despite this increase in the AVE rate, it has to be remembered that Norway, as a small and open 
economy, still was more liberal than may Western European countries and the USA (ibid). 
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The Banking Crisis (1987-1993)  
Investigating the trend line in figure 3 above it is clear that the AVE rate increased continuous ly 
until the 1940s. Thereafter a stable decreasing trend is visible. This development creates a clear 
U-form, with the maximum point in the mid-1930s.  
Before the Second World War, Norway did not have any particular regulation of foreign trade 
(with the exception of a few agreements on quotas). During the war, world trade collapsed.  The 
years exceeding this war saw a wave of international organizations being established, with the 
goal of re-stabilising world trade. The GATT was ratified by several countries, includ ing 
Norway. This included concrete agreements on tariff reduction, and other agreements aimed at 
reducing world trade restrictions (SSB, 1965). See appendix 1 for an overview over these 
agreements.  
The years leading up the banking crisis saw, if compared to the smoothest cycle in figure 2, 
several negative deviations from the otherwise decreasing trend. Figure 4 shows the actual AVE 
rates as deviations from trend. The AVE rate lies below both trend lines during the complete 
period although it is very close to the trend with a smoothing parameter of 100.  
Figure 4 AVE Rates Between 1970 and 2012 and HP-Trend for λ100 and λ2500 
 
Source: SSB (1971-2013), Norwegian Statistical Yearbook from 1971-2013, in tables: “Imports and 
Exports.” Pdf-files covering all years are available from SSB.no (2014) 
 
The oil chocks in the 1970s seriously affected that decade and the next in Norway, with a sharp 
decline in oil prices per barrel. During the Banking Crisis, Norway saw a sharp devaluation of 
the currency and tight monetary and fiscal policy. The Norwegian trade suffered significantly 
and moved from high surpluses to large deficits (Grytten & Hunnes, 2010). Appendix 4 and 5 
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illustrate the cycle deviations from trend of both the Norwegian CPI level and the import 
penetration rate. A deflation during the 1970s and the drop in import penetration are clearly 
visible in these figures. 
Despite the presence of international institutions and low tariff rates, figure 4 reveals a large 
positive deviation from trend around 1995. Re-investigating figure 2 on cycle deviations this 
period saw the largest positive deviation from trend, reaching a summit in 1995.  
Quantifying this with absolute values, table 10 shows a small increase in AVE rate of 0.5 
percentage points in the years between 1985 and 1995. While this increase is not impressive, 
relatively to the general decreasing trend, the aftermath of the Banking Crisis saw a large surge 
in AVE rate. This lends support to the theorem of a counter-cyclical relationship between 
protectionism and a financial crisis. 
Table 10 AVE Rates for Selected Years between 1985 and 2012 
Year AVE (custom duty) 
1985 0.73% 
1986 0.80% 
1991 0.87% 
1993 0.98% 
1995 1.27% 
Source: SSB (1986-1996), Norwegian Statistical Yearbook from 1986-1996, in tables: “Imports and 
Exports.” Pdf-files covering all years are available from SSB.no (2014) 
 
The Great Recession (2007-) 
The Great Recession saw only a small surge in protectionism of 0.12 percentage points between 
2005 and 2012 (see table 11). This small increase is hard to spot in figure 2 of cycle deviations 
and in figure 4 above. Appendix 6 includes a graph showing the actual AVE rate and the 
deviation from trend covering the time period 1995-2012. The small surge is visible in that 
graph, however, evidence during the next years is necessary to see if this is just a coincidence 
or a planned increase.  
Table 11 AVE Rates for Selected Years between 2000-2012 
Year AVE (custom duty) 
2000 0.67% 
2005 0.45% 
2008 0.41% 
2010 0.52% 
2012 0.57% 
 
Source: SSB (1986-1996), Norwegian Statistical Yearbook from 1986-1996, in tables: “Imports and 
Exports.” Pdf-files covering all years are available from SSB.no (2014) 
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One apparent change that created turmoil in the Norwegian news in 2010 was the change from 
specific to ad valorem import duties for liquid mild and cream. WTO’s policy review on trade 
policy in Norway calls this a conscious move to increase the border protection (WTO, 
WT/TPR/S/269). This provides evidence that the Norwegian levels of protectionism in terms 
on AVE rates still react to a financial crisis. However, the surge is small and might not provide 
support for a causal relationship anymore.   
 
The Great Recession was not as hard on Norway as on other western countries. The Norwegian 
government was able to prevent the external chock that hit Norway in 2008 from creating too 
much damage and ensured financial stability (ibid). It is possible to speculate that, if the crisis 
had hit Norway harder, the deviation from trend might have been larger. 
PSE rates 
As a comparison to the AVE rate, figure 5 (OECD.Stat, 20123 shows Norwegian PSE rates and 
its trend line. The same conclusion cannot be drawn from the PSE rates. The PSE rates move 
below the trend line in 1995 and above in 2002. A sharp negative deviation from trend in 2007 
before it increases again could however, maybe indicate a reaction to the Great Recession. 
 
 
Figure 5 PSE Rates between 1986 and 2012 and HP-Trend for λ100 and λ2500 
 
Source: (OECD.Stat, 2013) 
 
4.2. Descriptive data of the OLS models 
In the following Chapter, a coefficient is considered significant if it passes the five percent 
level. In the text percentage change refers to logarithmic and first differenced variables. 
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Pearson Correlations 
The correlation matrix in table 12 shows Pearson correlations between the Norwegian AVE 
rate and variables from the basic regression model with percentage change and as deviation 
from trend. Some additional variables are inserted that might be used to extend the model.  
The financial crisis dummy and the AVE rate are positively and significantly correlated both 
when measured against the unadjusted AVE rate and against percentage changes in AVE rate. 
This lends support to a counter-cyclical relationship between a financial crisis and Norwegian 
protection, however, it does not provide proof of a causal relationship. This variable is not 
significant at a five percent level when measured as deviations from trend. 
Unadjusted, all variables correlate significantly with AVE. This is expected in a time series 
model as time often has high explanatory relevance. Therefore, results from the first 
differenced variables might be of higher interest.  
In all of the models, CPI, unemployment and the USA AVE rate correlate significantly with 
the Norwegian AVE rate, with the expected sign from the endogenous protection model. 
GDPc only has a significant effect on percentage change in AVE, with a negative coefficient. 
The fixed exchange rate dummy has a positive, significant, effect on percentage changes in 
the AVE rate. 
Additional variables from other theories on protectionism, gross investments and average 
wage do not show any significant correlation with the AVE rate. The interest rate correlates 
positively when lagged by 1. Monetary volumes measured with M2 (broad money) and M0 
(narrow money excluding treasuries) are highly significant and reduces the AVE rate when 
measured as deviations from trend. 
Table 12 Pearson Correlation between AVE Norway and determinants (Norway). The determinant is, 
in all columns but for unadjusted variables, adjusted with its logarithmic value and first differenced 
Independent 
Variables 
Unadjusted 
variables 
Logarithmic 
and first 
differenced 
variables 
Logarithmic and 
first differenced. 
Determinants 
lagged by 1 
HP-Filtered 
cycles 
HP-filtered cycles, 
lagged by 1 
Financial crisis 
dummy 
0.192 **  0.314 *** - 0.154* - 
 
Lagged version of 
AVE Norway 
- - 0.214 ** - 0.893 *** 
GDPc 
 
-0.813 *** -0.163 * -0.202 ** 0.160 * 0.150 * 
CPI 
 
-0.731 *** -0.481 *** -0.269 *** -0.454 *** -0.314 *** 
Unemployment 
rate 
0.688 *** 
 
0.327 *** 
 
0.328 *** 
 
0.530*** 0.606*** 
Import 
penetration 
-0.760 *** 
 
-0.087 
 
0.129 0.113 0.657 
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AVE the United 
States 
0.893 *** 0.086 
 
0.159 * 
 
0.688 *** 0.736*** 
 
NOK/GBP 
0.616 *** -0.041 0.017 0.163* 0.170* 
 
NOK/USD 
-0.760 *** -0.032 -0.016   
GATT  
dummy 
-0.474 *** 0.017 - 0.073 - 
Fixed Exchange 
rate dummy 
0.223 *** -0.178 ** - 0.110 - 
Gross Investments -0.818 *** -0.051 -0.051 
 
-0.080 -0.132 
Average Wage -0.849 *** 
 
0.018 
 
0.041 
 
-0.152 -0.064 
M2 -0.570 *** 0.013 
 
0.016 -0.363 *** -0.575 *** 
M0 excl. treasury -0.622*** -0.013 -0.006 -0.661*** -0.234 *** 
Interest  Rate 0.261 *** 0.092 0.233***   
Source: See table 5 for variables in the endogenous protection model. For Gross Investments see 
Grytten (2004b), for M2 and M0 see Klovland (2004), for the interest rate see Klovland (2007) and for 
wages see Grytten (2007) 
* p<0.1 
**p<0.05 
***p<0.01 
 
Adjusting the OLS model  
In the model for percentage change, all the variables including the determinant are first 
differenced and adjusted by its logarithmic value. Appendix 7.1 shows residual plots for the 
OLS model when variables are unadjusted and appendix 7.2 shows residual plots for the OLS 
model when variables are first differenced. These models do not pass the Anderson Darling 
statistics for Normality nor the Durbin Watson test for autocorrelation. They are not stationary 
and might create biased coefficients.  
The model with both logarithmic and first differenced variables fits the criteria better 
(appendix 7.3). The GDPc is lagged by one as suggested by the person correlations, and the 
NOK/GBP by three. These were also the only significant versions of these two variables. 
Appendix 8.1 shows the residual plots for the model of percentage change including these 
adjustments, used in table x.  
The model that uses cycle values as deviation from HP-filtered trend passes the above 
mentioned tests without the need of first differencing the data. Appendix 8.2 shows the 
residual plot for the model of deviations from trend with these adjustments, used in table 15 
below. 
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Table 13 shows the results of the endogeneity test. In the case of inflation the previous year’s 
AVE rate significantly reduce the present year’s inflation rate. See appendix 9 for this test. 
This will be taken into consideration when analysing the data.  
Table 13 Results for hypothesis testing the exogeneity of the determinants from table 4  
Hypothesis Result 
H1: Norwegian AVE rates do not cause changes in the level of real GDP per capita Do not reject 
H2: Norwegian AVE rates do not cause changes in the level of unemployment Do not reject 
H3: Norwegian AVE rates do not cause changes in the level of import penetration Do not reject 
H4: Norwegian AVE rates do not cause changes in the CPI level Reject 
H5: Norwegian AVE rates do not cause changes in the U.S: AVE rate Do not reject 
Source: See table 5 that lists sources for all the variables 
 
4.3. The Time Series Regression Models 
Two models will be investigated, one that covers deviations from trend and one that 
investigates percentage change in the Norwegian level of average AVE rates. The phrase 
“conditioned upon a financial crisis“ refers to the variables multiplied by the financial crisis 
dummy. 
4.3.1. Deviations from trend, with the Norwegian AVE rate as the dependent variable 
In table 14, the OLS model with HP-filtered cycles of AVE as a dependent variable and HP-
filtered cycles of independent variables is reported. Any reference to variability and change in 
the determinants and dependent variable refers to deviations from trend. 
Goodness of fit 
Together, the variables in the basic model (i) explain 92.26% percent of the Norwegian AVE 
rate’s deviation from trend. Most of this can be contributed to the previous year’s AVE rate. 
Deviations from the AVE trend the previous year helps to explain, all else being equal, 
0.7594% of the AVE deviations from trend in the current year. This indicates that the 
Norwegian protectionism level is persistent. 
Appendix 10 shows the same model when inflation is removed as a determinant. Since 
inflation was found to be less exogenous and influenced by the AVE rate the effect without it 
in the model is of interest. Removing inflation from the model only decreased the goodness of 
fit by 0.33 percentage point. By itself, all else constant, a one percent deviation of the 
inflation rate from trend increases the AVE rate by 0.1343. This variable is not significant at a 
five percent level and most of the conclusions to the other variables remain the same. In the 
text, coefficients when excluding inflation are reported in brackets. 
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Coefficients of the endogenous protection model 
When import penetration deviates from trend by 1, the Norwegian AVE rate deviates with 
negative 0.377 (-0.355). This is the opposite result of what was expected by the endogenous 
protection theory.  
What is coherent with the theory is the U.S. AVE rate. Deviation from trend on the U.S. AVE 
rate last year by one results in deviations from trend also on the Norwegian AVE, of 0.3083 
(0.2417). Together, last year’s cycle change of the Norwegian and U.S. AVE rate explain 
most of the deviations from trend this year. Comparing manually the U.S. AVE cycle 
deviations (see appendix 11) to Norwegian AVE cycle deviations it is obvious that the two 
rates have followed a similar pattern. 
Excluding inflation makes GDP per capita significant at a 10 % level, with a coefficient of 
0.0228. This is an opposite result than what was expected from the theory. Still, this result did 
not pass the significance level of five percent. Including variables conditioned upon a 
financial crisis in model (ii) the GDPc becomes insignificant even at a 10 % level. 
Having a fixed exchange rate does not give a significant result in neither of the models. Nor 
does a change in the NOK/GBP variable. 
Financial crisis 
The other change that the inflation rate made was on the significance of the financial crisis 
dummy (cf. appendix 10). The presence of a financial crisis increases cycle deviations from 
trend in both cases, however, in table 14 when inflation is included it is not possible to say 
that the effect of a financial crisis is significantly different from 0. Including the inflation rate 
multiplied by the financial crisis dummy in model (i) instead of the inflation rate alone in 
model gives the same result as when inflation is removed altogether. 
The interpretation of import penetration, AVE USAt-1 and AVE Norwayt-1 remains the same in 
model (ii) as in model (i). The AVE rate in the U.S. only passes at a 10 % level. Instead, the 
U.S. Ave rate conditioned upon a financial crisis shows a significant result and increase AVE 
deviations from trend by 0.358% (0.331%).  
The inflation rate is not significant at a five percent level when conditioned upon a financial 
crisis. The unemployment rate, not conditioned upon a financial crisis, becomes significant in 
model (ii). A change in deviations from the unemployment trend will increase cycles in AVE 
by 0.0671. 
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Table 14 Dependent variable: Norwegian AVE gaps as cycle deviations from HP-Filtered Trend with 
λ=2500 
Independent 
Variables 
 
*all variables are 
gaps as cycle 
deviations from 
HP-filtered trend 
(i)  
Endogenous protection 
model  
(ii) 
Variables ×FC dummy 
(iii)  
Including membership in 
GATT 
Goodness of fit: 
 
 
Durbin Watson 
Anderson Darling 
 
R2 : 92.26% 
R2(adj): 91.31% 
 
1.87359>DU 
P-value : 0.579 
R2 : 93.14% 
R2(adj) : 91.87% 
 
2.14584>DU 
P-value : 0.803 
R2: 86.40 
R2(adj): 84.84% 
 
1.93501>DU 
P-value: 0.060 
Financial crisis 
dummy 
0.0122 
 
- 0.0024 
GDPc 0.207 
 
0.171 0.287 
Unemployment 0.0215 
 
0.0671 *** 
 
0.0225 
CPI 0.1343 * 
 
0.0538 0.1562 * 
Import penetration 
lagged by 1 
-0.337 *** 
 
-0.400 *** 
 
-0.451 *** 
 
NOK/GBP 
-0.0639 -0.004 
 
-0.138 
AVE United States 
lagged by 1 
0.3083 *** 
 
0.1588 * 
 
0.4006 *** 
AVE Norway 
lagged by 1 
0.7594 *** 
 
0.7608 *** 
 
0.6782 *** 
AVE trend line 0.141 
 
0.202 
 
0.232 
Fixed Exchange 
rate dummy 
- - 0.0126 
Membership in 
GATT dummy 
- - 0.0205 
GDPc ×FC dummy - 0.124 
 
- 
Unemployment×FC 
dummy 
- -0.0484 
 
- 
CPI ×FC dummy - 0.406 * 
 
- 
Import.P lagged by 
1 ×FC dummy  
- 0.400 
 
- 
NOK/GDP×FC 
dummy 
- -0.167 
 
- 
AVE USA lagged 
by 1×FC dummy 
- 0.358 ** 
 
- 
Source: See table 5 that lists sources for all the variables 
*p<0.1 
** p<0.05 
*** p<0.01 
 
4.3.2. Percentage changes: logarithmic value and first differenced AVE Norway 
Table 15 reports the results of the basic endogenous protection model in terms of percentage 
changes. Model (ii) includes the determinants multiplied by the financial crisis dummy. As all 
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the determinants are logged and first differenced all references to changes, variance or impact 
on the AVE rate refers to percentage changes. 
Goodness of fit 
Overall, the estimated regression equation in model (i) explains 62.19% of the variance in the 
Norwegian AVE rate. Adjusted for the number of determinants it explains 58.19% of the 
variance. Compared to the model with deviations from trend, this model has a lower goodness 
of fit. Adding the lagged Norwegian AVE rate in this model did not have any significant 
impact on the variance of the current AVE rate (see appendix 12).  Consequently, other 
variables not included in this basic model explain around 40 % of the variance of the AVE. 
For the same reason as above, appendix 13. shows the model from table 15 when inflation is 
excluded. When removing the inflation variable from the model the overall goodness of fit 
decreases (R2=50.94%).  When included, a one percent change in CPI leads to a negative 
percentage change in the AVE rate, of -0.317%, which explains this drop in R2.  
The interpretation of the other determinants from the endogenous protection model did not 
change by removing the inflation rate. Remember that the GDP per capita and import 
penetration are already adjusted for inflation. 
Coefficients of the endogenous protection model 
Applying the numbers from model (i) with the values excluding inflation in brackets, a one 
percent change in GDP per capita last year results in a -0.0378 (-0.0364) percentage change in 
the AVE rate this year. This is consistent with the endogenous protection hypothesis. It is 
only the lagged version of GDP per capita which has a significant effect on the AVE rate.  
Percentage changes in import penetration also reduce the current AVE rate, with a percentage 
change of -0.0898 (-0.0577). This is the opposite results than what was expected from the 
endogenous protection theory, where import penetration was assumed to create demand for 
protection and as such a positive percentage change. 
The only determinant that is significant and create a positive percentage change in the AVE 
rate is the AVE rate of the United States. The Norwegian rate responds with a 0.2165 
(0.3562) percentage change to a one percentage change in the U.S. AVE rate. Appendix 14.1 
tests the same model with lagged versions of the AVE USA rate. Including the lagged version 
of AVE USA to the model does not provide a significant result and the interpretation of the 
other coefficients remains the same. It is significant when the non-lagged version of AVE is 
removed, but with a smaller coefficient that the current year’s AVE USA rate. 
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Having a fixed exchange rate does not have a significant effect on percentage changes of the 
Norwegian AVE rate. Lagging the percentage changes in the NOK/GBP bilateral exchange 
rate with three shows a significant result, but only at the 10 % level, of 0.000694% 
(0.000862%).  Increasing values of NOK/GBP refers to a depreciation of the Norwegian 
Kroner. From the theory of endogenous protection an appreciation, not a depreciation was 
expected to increase the AVE rate. 
Removing inflation from the model makes discrepancies from this relationship less likely, and 
the NOK/GBP lagged by three variable is significant at a five percent level. Norway applied a 
fixed exchange rate for most of the period until 2001. Multiplying the NOK/GBP lagged by 
three variable with a floating exchange rate dummy gives the same conclusion as when 
inflation was removed. The significance level of the other variables in the model stay 
unchanged. See appendix 14.2 In conclusion, it appears to be a small positive relationship 
between the Norwegian AVE rate and depreciation of the NOK/GBP exchange rate. 
Financial crisis 
The presence of a financial crisis, all else being constant, increases the AVE rate by 0.00203 
%. However, this variable is not significant at a 10 % level. Therefore, in model (i) it is not 
possible to conclude that the effect of a financial crisis on percentage change in AVE always 
is significantly different from 0.  
Excluding inflation from the model (cf. appendix 13) reveals that the presence a financial 
crisis has a significant effect on the percentage changes of AVE at a five percent level. The 
presence of a financial crisis triggers a 0.00295 percentage increase in the AVE rate. That is a 
small increase as compared to the model with inflation in figure 15.  
When conditioned upon a financial crisis, in model (ii), import penetration and CPI do not 
confirm a significant relationship. The unemployment rate is still insignificant. 
The NOK/GBP variable lagged by three is not significant at a five percent level. Instead, a 
deprecation of this rate conditioned upon a financial crisis is significant, although with a small 
percentage change of 0.001739 (0.002276). 
The U.S. AVE rate conditioned upon a financial crisis shows a negative coefficient. That is, a 
one percent positive change in the U.S. AVE rate when there is a financial crisis in Norway 
results in a 0.211 (0.285) percentage decrease in the Norwegian AVE rate. However, it is only 
significant at a 10 % level unless inflation is excluded (cf. appendix 13) 
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 Further, the previous year’s percentage change in the AVE U.S. rate (in model ii b) does not 
affect the current changes in Norwegian AVE. This coefficient is positive (0.079) but not 
significant. Excluding inflation (cf. appendix 13) does not change that fact.  
The GDP per capita variable changes sign of its coefficient when conditioned upon a financial 
crisis. A one percent increase in the GDPc rate last year will increase the AVE rate this year 
with 0.0424 (percentage change). This variable is only significant at a 10 % level. Including 
the lagged AVE rate instead of the non-lagged, the GDPc variable conditioned upon a 
financial crisis becomes significant, and causes a percentage change in the AVE rate of 
0.0572.  
Table 15 OLS Results. Dependent variable: First differenced and logarithmic value of Norwegian 
AVE rate between 1866 and 2012. 
 
Independent 
Variables * 
 
*all variables are 
first differenced and 
transformed to its 
logarithmic value 
(i)  
Endogenous 
protection 
model 
(ii a)  
Variables × FC 
dummy 
(ii b) 
Variables × FC 
dummy with 
lagged USA AVE 
(iii)  
Including 
International 
institutions 
Goodness of fit: 
 
 
Durbin Watson 
Anderson Darling 
R2: 62.19% 
R2(adj): 58.19% 
 
1.83488>DU 
P-value 0.414 
R2 : 68.39% 
R2(adj): 62.85% 
 
2.09507>DU 
P-value 0.781 
R2: 65.11% 
R(adj): 59.01% 
 
2.03572>DU 
P-value: 0.263 
R2: 62.54% 
R2(adj): 58.08% 
 
1.84389>DU 
P-value 0.495 
Financial crisis  
dummy 
0.00203 - - 0.00180 
 
GDPc lagged by 1 -0.0378 *** -0.0564 *** -0.0571 *** -0.0393 *** 
Unemployment -0.00180 0.00034 0.00154 -0.00201 
CPI -0.3717 *** -0.03209 *** -0.04166 *** -0.03950 *** 
Import Penetration -0.0898 *** -0.0960*** -0.0849 *** -0.0928 *** 
NOK/GBP lagged 
by 3 
0.000694 * -0.000290 -0.000500 0.000639 * 
AVE_USA 0.2165 *** 0.3267 *** - 0.2090 *** 
AVE_USA lagged 
by 1 
- - 0.0862 - 
Fixed exchange rate 
dummy 
0.00036 -0.00028 0.00059 -0.00029 
AVE trend line 0.0111 0.0133 -0.0013 0.0050 
 
GATT Dummy - - - -0.00134 
GDPc lagged by 1 
×FC dummy 
- 0.0424 * 0.0572 ** 
 
- 
Unemployment 
×FC dummy 
- -0.00395 
 
-0.00263 - 
CPI ×FC dummy - -0.0285 
 
-0.0222 
 
- 
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Import 
Penetration×FC 
dummy 
- -0.0472 
 
-0.0633 
 
- 
NOK/GBP lagged 
by 3 ×FC dummy 
- 0.001739 ** 
 
0.001826 ** 
 
- 
AVE_USA ×FC 
dummy 
- -0.211 * 
 
- - 
AVE_USA lagged 
by 1 ×FC dummy 
  0.079 
 
 
Source: See table 5 that lists sources for all the variables 
*p<0.1 
** p<0.05 
*** p<0.01 
 
4.3.3. Investigating the role of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
Adding GATT membership in model (iii) as a dummy variable does not provide any further 
significant explanation to AVE deviations from trend (table 14) nor the percentage variance in 
the AVE rate (table 15). 
Appendix 15.1 and 15.2 include the models in table 14 and 15 in two categories: 1866-1950 
and 1950-2012. The Goodness of Fit decreases significantly for the model with percentage 
change in the post-GATT period as compared to the pre-GATT period (from 74.20% to 
24.03%). Neither of the variables from the endogenous protection model significantly 
influence the variance in (percentage change) of AVE. The trend line is the only significant 
variable and triggers negative percentage change in the AVE rate of -0.0411. 
In the models for deviation from trend, the goodness of fit remains high also in the post-
GATT period. The previous year’s AVE rate explains, all else being constant, 0.7768% of the 
variance of the current AVE deviations.  The inflation rate becomes significant in the post-
GATT scenario.  
Although only significant at a 10 % level, the filtered import penetration rate conditioned 
upon a financial crisis explains 1.483 of the variance in the filtered AVE rate. The financial 
crisis dummy is not significant in the post- nor pre-GATT scenario. Neither is the fixed 
exchange rate dummy or the NOK/GBP variable. 
 
4.3.4. Expanding models  
Appendix 16.1 and 16.2 show the OLS model (i) with several additional determinants, 
identified by other theories of protectionism to create variance in the average level of 
protectionism. These variables are also connected to a financial crisis, in particular the 
monetary volumes and investments. Those variables are assumed to increase before a crisis 
and decrease with the onset of a panic.  
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Filtered monetary volumes (M2) correlates significantly and negatively with the Norwegian 
AVE rate (-0.363 and lagged -0.575). It is not possible to conclude a causal relationship as the 
variable was not significant in the OLS model (c.f. appendix 16.1 and 16.2).   
The other variables showed no significant results, whether calculated as cycle deviations from 
trend nor as percentage annual change.  
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5. Elaboration upon findings 
Measured as deviation from trend it appears that the average level of protectionism in Norway 
often, but not always, moves counter-cyclically with a financial crisis. This interpretation can 
also be taken, qualitatively, for intentional devaluations of the Norwegian currency. Many of 
the determinants contradict the endogenous protection theory or are insignificant. Following 
other “great powers” seems to be the most viable solution for why the AVE rate often has 
moved with a financial crisis. 
5.1. How? 
When mapping HP-filtered cycles as deviation from trend it becomes evident that the average 
level of protectionism, here measured as the AVE rate, often begins to deviate positively from 
trend with the onset of a financial crisis. Smaller or larger increases in the actual AVE rate 
have occurred during all of the financial crisis with the exception of the Christiania Crisis. 
This provides a rough proof that protectionism in Norway has tended to move counter-
cyclically with a financial crisis. 
This finding is visible in the OLS regression models, through the financial crisis dummy. This 
dummy is denoted in both models with a positive coefficient. That is, the presence of a 
financial crisis increases the AVE rate through either a percentage change or a deviation from 
trend. Stand-alone, its Pearson correlation coefficient is significant and positive. In the OLS 
models, this dummy is not significant and therefore it is not possible to conclude that a 
financial crisis always increases the level of protectionism.  
This was suspected after investigating the Christiania crisis, which saw no countercyclical 
relationship. Although the financial crises in Norway have had many similarities and followed 
largely the development of a crisis as established by Kindleberger (cf. definition and see 
Grytten and Hunnes, 2010), there are differences among them. Kindleberger and Aliber 
(2011) said that a financial crisis often spreads internationally but the channels through which 
it spreads change from crisis to crisis.  This can explain why the strength of the AVE-cycle 
differs between financial crises.  
The significance of a financial crisis seems to fluctuate with inflation. This is not surprising. 
A financial crisis is often associated with serious deflation, while the preceding boom often 
sees sharp inflation (cf. definition of a financial crisis). The inclusion of inflation might have 
outweighed the effect of a financial crisis.  
 
 
46. 
5.2. Why? 
Having established that (relative to trend) protectionism have often moved with the financial 
crises, the interesting question is why. A distinction in the interpretation of some of the 
variables occur is the OLS model of percentage change as compared to the OLS model 
measuring deviation from trend.  
An explanation to this might be the high coefficient of the proceeding year’s AVE deviations 
from trend on the dependent variable. From the figure showing AVE cycles as deviations 
from trend (cf. figure 2), it is evident that the cycle deviations are relatively enduring. That is, 
the AVE values deviate positively or negatively from trend for many years at a time. 
Investigating the plot of the logarithmic and first differenced AVE rate (see appendix 17), 
shows that the percentage changes in the AVE rate are less enduring. Contrary to deviations 
from trend, these values fluctuate more rapidly. Negative percentage changes occur during 
most of the financial crisis despite the fact that the actual AVE level is relatively high as 
compared to “normal times.” It is therefore logical that the interpretation in the two models 
differs for some of the variables. This insight is necessary for some of the interpretations 
below. 
5.2.1. Import penetration 
Both the models of percentage change and deviation from trend find that the Norwegian level 
of protectionism decreases with import penetration. A negative sign on the coefficient of 
import penetration contradicts the pre-assumed relationship in the endogenous protection 
model. In accordance with the theory, lobby groups are expected to pressure for more 
protection when their business is threatened by foreign competitors.  
Conversely, a negative coefficient is consistent with the empirical investigations of Gawande 
et al. (2011). Gawande et al. (2011) interpret the negative coefficient in their study as a result 
of tighter international trade and production linkages in present time. Norway, as a small open 
economy, has depended upon imported final goods and imports to production for a longer 
time-period than larger developed countries.  
Proof of this is added in appendix 18, which shows the large dependency rates of imports to 
various Norwegian sectors in the 1950s. Due to this dependency, increased protection would 
make the imported goods more expensive. This will do more harm than good to many 
industries. Plotting the data for import penetration into a diagram (cf. appendix 5) shows that 
the amount of imports, as compared to domestic consumption, has increased constantly over 
the years. It is therefore highly likely that the negative relationship will continue. 
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The effect of import penetration during a financial crisis is not significantly different from 
zero. This result is somewhat surprising due to the high significance during the whole time-
period. 
During a financial crisis, the level of import quantity and value of imports are assumed to 
decrease (cf. definition). In the regression model, this would trigger a positive AVE-deviation 
from trend and positive percentage changes in the AVE rate, since the coefficient is denoted 
with a negative sign. The lack of significance during a financial crisis indicates that a drop in 
import penetration do not trigger such an increase in protectionism.  
Increasing prices for imported goods, when import volumes in general are decreasing, will be 
extremely costly for the import dependent industries. Rather, one could have expected a 
positive coefficient during times of financial crises. That other variables such as the U.S. 
AVE rate have been proved to increase the Norwegian AVE rate might have offset such a 
result.  
In conclusion, the import penetration rate is not a contributor to the, although imperfect, 
counter-cyclicality spotted in the figures in Chapter 4.1.  
5.2.2. Inflation 
Inflation results in a negative and significant percentage change in the AVE rate. This 
indicates that, when domestic prices increase (in percent) the demand for protectionism 
decreases as a way of offsetting this price increase. As it is established that Norway largely 
depends on imported goods, a decrease in tariffs arguable has an important effect on the 
domestically price level. This statement was proved in table 13 above.  
A more technical consideration has to be taken into consideration. Since the Norwegian 
authorities have used a majority of specific tariffs rather than ad valorem tariffs, the AVE will 
to some extent automatically move with inflation. While a specific tariff is constant (e.g., per 
kilogram) import values in kroners will move with inflation. When calculating the fraction of 
specific tariff versus import values, the AVE rate will automatically decrease in periods with 
inflation and increase in periods with deflation. As such, protectionism measured with AVE 
might move countercyclically to a financial crisis without being a response to higher demand 
for protectionism.  
Deflating the AVE rate did not change the interpretation of the HP-filtered cycles (cf. 
appendix 2). In the case of deviations from trend, the inflation rate has a positive coefficient, 
however, this result is not significant, nor did it have any particular effect on the overall 
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goodness of fit of the model.  It appears that the percentage changes in the AVE rate due to 
inflation is the result of applying special tariffs rather than ad valorem tariffs. That is, since 
the effect of inflation is not large enough to cause deviations from the AVE trend, it is 
possible to suggest that inflation does not trigger much demand for protectionism, and that the 
significant effect on percentage change is due to technicalities.  
5.2.3. Unemployment 
Increased unemployment only significantly affects variation in the AVE rate in model (ii), 
deviations from trend (cf. table 14). This indicates that unemployment in Norway has to 
deviate significantly and positively to trigger a response for protection.  
Annual fluctuations and percentage change do not cause a (causal) demand for protection. 
Unemployment might increase by a certain percentage in one period but still lie below the 
trend line. In that case, the unemployment problem might not be perceived as significantly 
threatening. When unemployment reaches above the average trend, the general and specific 
interest groups might be more aware of possible consequences for domestic job creation.  
In addition, this result was only significant in model (ii) when the financial crisis dummy 
variable was included. Since a financial crisis often fortifies the problem of unemployment, it 
is logical that the presence a financial crisis dummy in the model reinforces the effect of 
unemployment on the variance in the AVE rate. 
GDPc 
Percentage change in the GDP per capita rate results in a negative percentage change in the 
AVE rate, as suspected by the theory and from most of the empirical research.  A significant 
effect of GDPc on AVE deviations from trend was not found. This is the opposite of what was 
found for unemployment.  
The sign of the (percentage change) GDPc coefficient becomes positive when the variable is 
multiplied with the financial crisis dummy. This change can be understood with simple 
addition. The percentage change in GDPc during a financial crisis is expected to be negative. 
When adding a negative variable to the, now positive, coefficient the percentage change in the 
AVE rate will still decline. The relationship between a percentage change in the GDPc rate 
and the AVE rate is therefore consistent, and increases AVE during a financial crisis.  
In essence, despite the significant effect of GDP per capita on percentage changes in the AVE 
rate, the GDP per capita is not a contributor to creating cycle deviations from trend and the 
counter-cyclical relationship seen in Chapter 4.1. 0 
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5.2.4. Exchange rate 
A fixed exchange rate is negatively (Pearson) correlated with percentage changes in 
protectionism. A causal relationship is not found, as this dummy variable remains highly 
insignificant when included in the OLS model. As Norway used a fixed exchange rate, with 
only a few exceptions until the 2001, this is not surprising.  
Evident from Chapter 4.1. is that the Norwegian government intentionally allowed for a 
devaluation of the currency, to diminish the pressure the contractive policy had created, after 
the Long Depression and at the end of the Great Depression. A devaluation of the currency 
was used also during the Banking Crisis. The theory of endogenous protection assumed that a 
fixed exchange rate increases trade protectionism as a counter repose to changed 
competitiveness. In Norway, since the exchange rate was not kept fixed, the devaluation in 
itself improved the competitiveness. 
It is clear, from the above comment, that the currency exchange, which is a protectionism 
measure (cf. figure 1), was used actively as a method to decrease the disastrous effects of the 
financial crisis, and to increase Norway’s competitiveness.  
A causal relationship between the two measures of protectionism, AVE and currency 
exchange, could therefore be expected. That is, by actively using the currency exchange, 
further tariff barriers might not be necessary to protect the domestic market. Eichengreen and 
Irwin (2009), who found that the Scandinavian countries turned less to protectionism than 
gold block countries during the 1930s, back this conclusion. However as these actions were 
not random but subject to a specific political action it is not possible to draw a causal 
conclusion from the use of the exchange rate on the AVE rate.  
USA AVE Rate 
In both models, the U.S. AVE rate explains a large and significant part of the variation in the 
Norwegian AVE rate today. This variable is also the only significant variable, at a five 
percent level, that explains positive deviations from trend during a financial crisis. This 
finding is consistent with the theory and with most empirical research. As a small open 
economy, it is logical that Norway follows the great powers.  
It is doubtable that Norway increased its AVE rate to retaliate against the USA. As a small 
open economy Norway has a lower ability to affect world prices. It is likely that Norway 
followed the process of the influencers, setting low tariff rates during normal times and 
increase them because, and only when, the large countries did. If Norway decided to increase 
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the AVE rate alone, she would likely face a large retaliation from trading partners as an 
attempt to scare Norway to decrease the tariff rate again.  
This can explain why the Christiania Crisis, which only had national reach, did not see the 
same surge in cycle deviations from trend as during the other Financial Crisis. It can also 
explain why, although the Norwegian AVE rate increased, the Norwegian trade policy was 
more liberal than other Western Countries and the United States during the inter war crisis 
(c.f. Grytten, 2002).  
The model with percentage changes shows a negative coefficient of the U.S. AVE rate when 
this variable is multiplied with the financial crisis dummy. Excluding inflation, this variable is 
significant at a five percent level. This variable is insignificant when lagged, both with and 
without inflation. This is the opposite result as found when investigating deviations from 
trend as the U.S. AVE rate significantly triggered positive variation in the AVE rate as 
deviations from trend. 
Percentage changes in the US AVE rate might not be perceived as equally threatening to the 
Norwegian export sector as a positive deviation from trend. That is, the rate might still lie 
below the trend line and be perceived as relatively low despite a positive percentage increase 
in year t. However, when the U.S. AVE rate is moving above trend it is perceived as 
relatively large. Since the previous year’s AVE deviation from trend increase the deviation in 
the current year, the Norwegian AVE rate will continue to increase once it reaches above the 
trend line. The welfare loss might be large and thus trigger a higher AVE rate to try to restore 
this situation.  
Summarized, the U.S. AVE rate is a significant contributor to the cycle effects seen in 
Chapter 4.1., and an increase in deviation from trend will create large positive deviations from 
trend also in Norway. 
5.3. Counter-cyclicality in the late 20th century? 
An interesting finding worth some elaboration is the deviation from trend during the Banking 
Crisis. Although the actual change in AVE rate was rather small as compared to previous 
years (0.5%), this period saw the largest cycle deviations from trend. The large positive cycle 
deviation can be explained by a “sharp” increase in AVE rate relatively to the already low 
rate.  
The trend line from figure 3 above showed that the ratification of the GATT agreement 
clearly decreased the absolute level of AVE in Norway. Although the absolute level of AVE 
 
 
51. 
is low, the tariff rate can still be elevated up until the bound rate allowing for deviations from 
trend. 
In the post-GATT scenario (cf. appendix 15) the goodness of fit between the macroeconomic 
determinants from the endogenous protection model and percentage changes in the AVE rate 
largely decreased. The trend line is the only significant variable of those included and this is 
decreasing the overall AVE rate after GATT.  
In the pre-GATT scenario, the macro-economic variables have the same explanatory 
significance as in tables 14 and 15, chapter 4. This shows that variables connected to a 
financial crisis do not explain much of the changes in the AVE level in present time, as they 
did before GATT. It also shows that the introduction of GATT made protectionism in Norway 
more resistant to macro-economic variables. 
In model (ii), Post-GATT, deviations from trend, (although only at a 10 % level) the import 
penetration multiplied by the financial crisis dummy becomes large with a positive 
coefficient. This was not the case in table 14 or table 15 in Chapter 4, where the coefficient is 
negative. A possible explanation to this is the large trade deficits facing Norway during the 
Banking Crisis (cf. appendix 5). It is thus natural that the coefficient is positive, indicating 
that a decrease in import penetration decrease the average level of AVE. 
Further, in the OLS model showing deviations from trend, the inflation rate becomes a 
significant variable in the post-GATT scenario as opposed to the pre-GATT scenario. 
Connecting this to the knowledge of cycle deviations from inflation-trend (cf. appendix 4) the 
connection is clear. The inflation rate deviates negatively from trend before 1986, connected 
to the oil chock, while it deviates positively from trend during the late 1980s and until 1996. 
It appears therefore that the large cycle deviation from trend in the mid-1990s is a result of the 
inflation rate deviating positively from trend as compared to the sharp deflation following in 
the proceeding time-period. As a financial crisis is largely connected with a deflation it does 
not provide strong evidence for a counter-cyclical relationship between a financial crisis and 
the average level of protectionism after 1950. 
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6. Conclusions and suggestion for future research 
The present dissertation intends to explain the overall research question: “how and why do a 
financial crisis affect the level of average protectionism in Norway?” It also intends to 
investigate if the interpretation has changes in time. 
Partial evidence of a countercyclical relationship between the AVE rate and financial crisis is 
found. During each of these financial crises, with the exception of the Christiania Crisis, the 
AVE level deviated positively from trend following a period of negative deviations from 
trend. The After-War Crisis, the Great Depression and the Banking crisis saw the largest 
positive AVE-deviations from trend.  
A countercyclical relationship between a financial crisis and protectionism was doubted in the 
introduction for small open economies due to the lack of ability to affect world price. 
Evidence of such a relationship seems nevertheless to exist, mostly because Norway is found 
to follow “the great power.” Deviations from AVE-trend in the USA is the dominant reason 
for the positive deviations from trend in Norway, also during a financial crisis. The same 
interpretation can be applied to percentage changes in the AVE rates.  
Norway followed the U.S. in both AVE-booms and AVE-busts. As a small open economy it 
makes sense that Norway choose to follow the influencers. If Norway decided to increase the 
AVE rate alone, she would likely face a large retaliation in return and be forced to decrease 
the AVE rate. 
Increasing positive trend deviations from the unemployment rate is also found to cause 
positive deviations from trend in the AVE rate. This is a classical response to protect the 
domestic market from foreign competition. Import penetration on the other hand contribute to 
decrease the AVE rate rather than increasing it. This is due to the Norwegian industry’s 
dependency on imported goods.  
Despite an apparent relationship between a financial crisis and protectionism in Norway, it is 
not possible to confirm a causal countercyclical relationship in an OLS model. A reason for 
this is the low explanatory power of macro-economic variables on the average level of 
protectionism after the introduction of GATT. Another reason is the lack of an AVE increase 
during the Christiana crisis.  
Further, the large positive cycle deviation from trend during the Banking Crisis can be 
explained by an increase in the inflation rate rather than the presense of a financial crisis. It 
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appears that the counter-cyclical relationship is partly broken as a response to the introduction 
of GATT. 
6.1. Suggestions for further research 
To broaden the understanding of how and why a financial crisis affect the level of 
protectionism today it is possible to gather data for less transparent, non-tariff barriers. It is 
evident that the AVE rate in Norway on average is low except for in certain industries. As 
such, a bigger threat comes from measures of protectionism that are less apparent to us today.  
Work on calculating and understanding various versions of NTBs are still under progress, and 
a thorough investigation of data when they become available will give valuable insights. 
Comparing such results to that of the AVE can indicate if a countercyclical relationship exists 
for other measures than tariffs. 
Further, it will be interesting to compare the results of Norway to that of other small open 
economies. This will make it possible to give a conclusion on the external validity of the 
results in this report.  
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8. Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: The General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade 
 
Appendix 1 Selected articles from GATT 
Article number: Article content 
Art. 1 on most favoured 
nations (MFN) 
“Bilateral concessions must be extended to the other contracting parties.”  
Art. 3 on national 
treatments  
“The products from one importing contracting party should not be directly 
or indirectly subject to internal taxes or charges in excess of those applied 
directly or indirectly to like domestic products.” 
Art. 6 on anti-dumping 
(AD) and countervailing 
duties  
AD is introducing a good to a market at a price less than its normal value. 
In order to use this rule the AD must have a risk of damage in the domestic 
industry. AD can be justified on the grounds of public welfare and 
learning-by-doing from developing industries.  
In order to prevent AD a contracting party may levy on any dumped 
product an AD-duty not greater than the margin of dumping. This is called 
a countervailing duty. 
Art. 11 on the prohibition 
of quotas in the favour of 
tariffs  
“No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, 
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other 
measures, shall be instituted or maintained”.  
This is to ensure greater visibility (as the effect of price elasticity is easier 
to determine than potential changes in quantity), facilitate negotiations 
(due to greater visibility) and ensure government income. Quotas can be 
justified on grounds of macroeconomic instability. 
Art. 16 on export 
subsidies  
Export subsidies are forbidden for manufactured exports, but accepted for 
primary products. However, the contracting parties should seek to avoid 
this use. If  a contracting party grants directly or indirectly any form of 
subsidy which contributes to increasing exports this subsidy cannot be 
applied in a manner so that the contracting party gains more than a 
“equitable” share of world export trade. 
Art. 19 on safeguard 
measures  
A Party can deny access of a foreign product if it is possible to prove that 
the product can threaten a national product or a national industry. 
Quantitative proof is not necessary. The reporting party has to inform in 
writing the contracting party of their use of article 19 so that the 
Contracting Party can react. It should be limited in time and give rise to  
negotiations.  
Relevant derogations to 
the GATT Agreement 
The GATT articles does not cover agriculture or services. 
Contracting Parties are allowed to reduce tariff and quotas for developing 
countries and least developed countries without infringing article 01 on 
MFN clauses. 
 
Source: Defraigne, J.-C., 2013. European Economic Policy. Louvain la Neuve: Louvain School of 
Management, LSMS 2060. 
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Appendix 2: Filtered and deflated AVE rate, 1866-2012 
 
Appendix 2 Norwegian AVE (deflated) gaps as cycle deviations from HP-Filtered Trend 1866-2012 
 
Source: SSB (1880-2013), Norwegian Statistical Yearbook from 1880-2013, in tables: “Imports and 
Exports.” Pdf-files covering all years are available from SSB.no (2014). 
 
 
Appendix 3: AVE rate and its HP-filtered trend, 1866-1915 
 
Appendix 3 Norwegian AVE rate between 1866 and 1915 and HP-Trend for λ100 and λ2500 
 
Source: SSB (1880-1914), Norwegian Statistical Yearbook from 1880-1914, in tables: “Imports and 
Exports.” Pdf-files covering all years are available from SSB.no (2014). 
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Appendix 4: Filtered CPI rate, 1866-2012 
 
Appendix 4 CPI gaps as cycle deviations from HP-filtered trend 1866-2012 
 
 
Source: Grytten (2004a) 
 
Appendix 5: Import Penetration over time including its trend line with λ=2500 
 
Appendix 5 Import Penetration over time in 2005-prices, including its trend line with λ=2500 
 
Source: Import Penetration calculated with value in NOK of GDP, value in NOK of imports and value 
in NOK of exports, in 2005 prices, collected from Grytten (2004b) 
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Appendix 6: AVE rate and its HP-filtered trend, 1990-2012 
 
Appendix 6 AVE Rates Between 1990 and 2012 and HP-Trend for λ100 and λ2500 
 
Source: SSB (1991-2013), Norwegian Statistical Yearbook from 1991-2013, in tables: “Imports and 
Exports.” Pdf-files covering all years are available from SSB.no (2014). 
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Appendix 7: Residual Plots for various versions of the OLS model 
 
Appendix 7.1 Residual plots for AVE Norway versus unadjusted determinants* 
 
 
Source: see table 5, p.23 in the main text 
 
Durbin Watson Statistics: 1.00132<DL at α=0.05 and N>100 
*Model also includes a financial crisis dummy, an exchange rate dummy and a trend line 
 
Appendix 7.2. Residual plots for first differenced AVE Norway versus first differenced determinants   
 
Source: see table 5, p.23 in the main text 
 
Durbin Watson Statistics= 1.51430<DL at α=0.05 and N>100 
*Model also includes a financial crisis dummy, an exchange rate dummy and a trend line 
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Appendix 7.3. Residual plot for Logged and first differenced AVE Norway versus logarithmic and first 
differenced determinants,  
 
Source: see table 5, p.23 in the main text 
 
Durbin Watson Statistics = 2.00147> DU at α=0.05 and N>100 
*Model also includes a financial crisis dummy, an exchange rate dummy and a trend line 
 
Appendix 8: Residual Plots for the models used in the dissertation 
Appendix 8.1 Residual Plots for table x. on OLS results with first differenced and logarithmic values 
 
Source: see table 5, p.23 in the main text 
 
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.81519 > DU at α=0.05 and N>100 
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Appendix 8.2. Residual Plots for table x. on OLS results with variables as deviations from trend  
 
Source: see table 5, p.23 in the main text 
 
Appendix 9: Testing the significance of AVEt-1 on the determinants 
 
Appendix 9 Testing the significance of AVEt-1 on the determinants in the OLS model. Dependent 
variable: see column 1. Independent variables: AVEt-1 and variables mentioned in column 4. 
Dependent variables  Logarithmic and 
first differenced 
dependent 
variable 
Logarithmic and 
lagged dependent 
variable 
Other variables added in the 
model as determinants that might 
affect the dependent variable: 
AVE does not cause 
changes in the level 
of import penetration 
β AVEt-1: 0.030 ** 
F: 5.04% 
Do not reject 
- Logarithmic, first differenced and 
lagged: GDPc, NOK/GBP, 
NOK/USD, Investment and 
monetary volumes 
AVE does not cause 
changes in the level 
of GDPc 
- β AVEt-1 -0.561 **: 
F: 18.95% 
Do not reject 
Export-Import, Investments, 
monetary volumes and interest rate 
AVE does not cause 
changes in the level 
of CPI 
Β AVEt-1: -2.890 
F: 13.67% 
Reject 
- Monetary volumes, interest rate, 
exchange rate 
AVE does not cause 
changes in the level 
of the unemployment 
rate 
β AVEt-1 :1.80 ** 
F: 10.95% 
Do not reject 
- Interest rate, GDP, monetary levels, 
imports and exports  
AVE does not cause 
changes in the level 
of AVE_USA 
β AVEt-1: 0.280 ** 
F: 1.17% 
Do not reject 
-  
Source: see table 5, p.23 in the main text 
 
Do not reject if p<0.05 
*p>0.05 
**p>0.1 
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Appendix 10: the OLS model (filtered) when inflation is excluded as a determinant 
 
 
Appendix 10 OLS model with HP-filtered cycles at λ=2500 when excluding inflation as a variable 
Independent Variables (1) 
Endogenous protection model  
(2)  
Variables ×FC dummy  
Goodness of fit: 
 
 
Durbin Watson 
Anderson Darling 
 
R2 : 91.93% 
R2(adj) : 91.04% 
 
1.79136>DU 
P-value : 0.593 
R2 : 92.57% 
R2 (adj) : 91.33% 
 
1.87697>DU 
P-value : 0.973 
Financial crisis dummy 0.0228 ** 
(0.047) 
- 
Filtered GDPc 0.249 * 
(0.061) 
0.178 
(0.232) 
Filtered Unemployment 0.0247 
(0.113) 
0.0755 *** 
(0.002) 
Filtered and lagged import 
penetration 
-0.355 *** 
(0.005) 
-0.410 *** 
(0.004) 
 
Filtered NOK/GBP 
-0.0080 
(0.918) 
0.023 
(0.837) 
 
Filtered and lagged AVE 
United States 
 
0.2417 *** 
(0.000) 
0.1493 ** 
(0.048) 
Filtered and lagged AVE 
Norway 
0.7438 *** 
(0.000) 
0.7265 *** 
(0.000) 
AVE trend line 0.062 
(0.559) 
0.189 
(0.155) 
Membership in GATT dummy - - 
Filtered GDPc ×FC dummy - -0.125 
(0.649) 
Filtered unemployment×FC 
dummy 
- -0.0820 ** 
(0.018) 
Filtered and  lagged Import.P 
×FC dummy  
- 0.349 
(0.264) 
Filtered NOK/GDP×FC 
dummy 
- 0.076 
(0.690) 
Filtered and lagged AVE 
USA×FC dummy 
- 0.331 ** 
(0.024) 
Source: see table 5, p.23 in the main text 
*p<0.1 
**p<0.05 
***p<0.01 
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Appendix 11 Filtered U.S. AVE Rate 
Appendix 11 U.S AVE gaps as cycle deviations from HP-Filtered Trend 1891-2010 with λ=2500 
 
Source: (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2011) 
 
Appendix 12: The OLS model of percentage change included AVE Norway t-1 
 
Appendix 12 OLS model including the lagged version of the dependent variable as a determinant  
Independent Variables (1) Endogenous protection model included 
logdiff AVE Norway t-1 
Goodness of fit 
 
 
Durbin Watson Statistics 
Anderson Darling Statistics 
R2: 63.70% 
R2(adj): 59. 
 
2.10692 
P-value: 0.138 
LogDiffLag (GDPc) -0.0258 * 
(0.074) 
LogDiff (Unemployment rate) -0.00115 
(0.457) 
LogDiff (CPI) -0.03501 *** 
(0.000) 
LogDiff Import Penetration -0.0879 *** 
(0.000) 
LogDiffLag_3 (NOK/GBP) 0.000626 
(0.114) 
LogDiffLag (AVE_USA) 0.2028 *** 
(0.001) 
Financial crisis dummy 0.00180 
(0.176) 
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Fixed exchange rate dummy 0.0006 
(0.962) 
AVE trend line 0.0125 
(0.254) 
LogDiffLag AVE_NOR 0.0767 
(0.345) 
Source: see table 5, p.23 in the main text 
 
*p<0.1 
** p<0.05 
*** p<0.01 
 
Appendix 13: the OLS model (percentage change) when inflation is excluded as a 
determinant 
 
Appendix 13 OLS model with logarithmic and first difference variables when excluding inflation as a 
variable 
Independent 
Variables 
(1)  
Endogenous protection 
model excluding 
inflation 
(2a)  
Variables × FC dummy 
excluding inflation 
(2b)  
AVE USA lagged by 1  
excluding inflation 
Goodness of fit 
 
 
Durbin Watson  
Anderson Darling 
R2: 50.94% 
R2(adj): 46.37% 
 
1.84466>DU 
P-value 0.051 
R2: 58.50% 
R2(adj): 52.43% 
 
2.11675>DU 
p-value 0.055 
R2: 48.76% 
R2(adj): 41.26% 
 
2.01204>DU 
P-value: <0.005 
Financial crisis 
dummy 
0.00295 ** 
(0.039) 
- - 
LogDiffLag 
(GDPc) 
-0.0364 ** 
(0.013) 
-0.0932 * 
(0.057) 
-0.0342 
(0.133) 
LogDiff 
(Unemployment) 
-0.00199 
(0.257) 
0.00071 
(0.747) 
0.00272 
(0.261) 
LogDiff (CPI) - - - 
LogDiff Import 
Penetration 
-0.0577 *** 
(0.009) 
-0.0738 *** 
(0.001) 
-0.0416 * 
(0.072) 
LogDiffLag_3 
(NOK/GBP) 
0.000862 ** 
(0.042) 
-0.0392 * 
(0.057) 
-0.000646 
(0.312) 
LogDiff 
(AVE_USA) 
0.3562 *** 
(0.000) 
0.5270 *** 
(0.000) 
- 
LogDiffLag 
(AVE_USA) 
- - 0.2882 *** 
(0.001) 
Fixed exchange 
rate dummy 
0.00011 
(0.932) 
-0.00153 
(0.204) 
-0.00059 
(0.660) 
AVE trend line 0.0276 ** 
(0.021) 
0.0381 *** 
(0.002) 
0.0271 ** 
(0.046)  
LogDiffLag 
(GDPc) ×FC 
dummy 
 0.0105 
(0.681) 
0.0230 
(0.423) 
LogDiff 
(Unemployment)×
FC dummy 
 -0.00168 
(0.638) 
0.00207 
(0.577) 
LogDiff Import 
Penetration×FC 
dummy 
 0.0585 
(0.492) 
-0.0393 
(0.678) 
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LogDiffLag_3 
(NOK/GBP) ×FC 
dummy 
 0.002276 *** 
(0.007) 
0.002607 *** 
(0.005) 
LogDiff 
(AVE_USA) ×FC 
dummy 
 -0.285 ** 
(0.021) 
- 
LogDiffLag 
(AVE_USA) ×FC 
dummy 
  -0.037 
(0.775) 
Source: see table 5, p.23 in the main text 
 
*p<0.1 
** p<0.05 
*** p<0.01 
 
Appendix 14: Testing different versions of the OLS model of percentage change  
 
Appendix 14.1 Testing OLS model with lagged versions of the (logdiff) AVE USA rate and the import 
penetration variable.  The columns show which variables are adjusted differently than in row 1  
Independent 
Variables* 
 
*all variables with 
logarithmic value and 
first differenced 
(i)  
AVE USA lagged by 1 
is added to the model 
(i)  
AVE USA is lagged 
by 1 added, 
excluding non-
lagged version 
(i)  
Import penetration lagged 
by 1 is added to the model 
Goodness of fit 
 
 
Durbin Watson  
Anderson Darling 
R2: 63. 06% 
R(adj): 58.17% 
 
1.89345>DU 
P-value: 0.472 
R2: 60.08% 
R(adj): 55.33% 
 
1.95953 
P-value: 0.092 
R2: 62.56% 
R(adj): 57.59% 
 
1.84616 
P-value: 0.434 
Financial crisis 
dummy 
0.00163 
 
0.00168 0.00184 
GDPc lagged by 1 -0.0356 *** -0.0351 ** -0.0372 ** 
Unemployment -0.00146 0.00044 -0.00207 
CPI -0.03741 *** -0.04381 *** -0.03923 *** 
Import Penetration -0.0887 *** -0.0836 *** -0.0934 *** 
Import penetration 
lagged by 1 
-  -0.0082 
NOK/GBP lagged 
by 3 
0.000589 * 0.000492 0.000641 
AVE_USA 0.1754 ** - 0.2086 ** 
AVE USA lagged 
by 1 
0.0657 
 
0.1374 ** - 
Fixed exchange rate 
dummy 
0.00013 -0.00020 -0.00022 
GATT dummy -0.00109 -0.0013 -0.00130 
AVE trend line 0.0073 0.0034 0.0051 
Source: see table 5, p.23 in the main text 
 
*p<0.1 
** p<0.05 
*** p<0.01 
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Appendix 14.2. OLS model with NOK/GBP X Floating exchange rate as a variable  
Independent Variables  (1) Endogenous protection 
model 
(1) Endogenous protection model 
without inflation 
F statistics 
 
 
Durbin Watson 
Anderson Darling 
R2: 64.83% 
R2(adj) 61.11% 
 
1.97790 
p-value: 0.345 
R2: 54.77% 
R2(adj): 50.56% 
 
1.96328 
P-value: 0.068 
Financial crisis  
dummy 
0.00121 
(0.144) 
0.00261 * 
(0.058) 
LogDiffLag_1 (GDPc) -0.0375 *** 
(0.003) 
-0.0362 ** 
(0.010) 
LogDiff (Unemployment) -0.00093 
(0.541) 
-0.00094 
(0.585) 
LogDiff (CPI) -0.03534 *** 
(0.000) 
- 
LogDiff (Import Penetration) -0.0899 *** 
(0.000) 
-0.0597 *** 
(0.005) 
LogDiffLag_3 
(NOK/GBP) ×floating rate 
0.001761 *** 
(0.002) 
0.002129 *** 
(0.001) 
LogDiff(AVE_USA) 0.1916 *** 
(0.001) 
0.3178 *** 
(0.000) 
Fixed exchange rate dummy 0.00051 
(0.653) 
0.00031 
(0.808) 
AVE trend line 0.0070 
(0.513) 
0.0216 * 
(0.063) 
Membership in GATT dummy - - 
Source: see table 5, p.23 in the main text 
 
*p<0.1 
** p<0.05 
*** p<0.01 
 
Appendix 15: Testing Explanatory Power of GATT on the Norwegian AVE rate 
 
Appendix 15.1 OLS model divided into pre-GATT and post-GATT scenarios. Dependent variable: 
Cycle deviations from HP-filtered trend with λ2500 
Independent 
Variables* 
 
*all variables are 
HP-filtered cycles 
(1)  
Pre-GATT 
(1866-1950) 
(1)  
Post-GATT (1950-
2012) 
(2)  
Pre-GATT 
(1866-1950) X 
FC 
(2) 
Post-GATT (1950-
2012) X FC 
F statistics 
 
 
Durbin Watson 
Anderson Darling 
R2 : 96.17% 
R2(adj) : 94.79% 
 
1.71825 
p-value : 0.811 
R2: 90.70% 
R2(adj): 88.99% 
 
2.24083 
P-value: 0.393 
R2: 96.81% 
R2(adj): 94.58% 
 
1.98518 
P-value: 0.423 
R2: 91.51% 
R2(adj): 88.74% 
 
2.52161 
P-value: 0.564 
Financial crisis 
dummy 
0.0030 
(0.901) 
-0.0064 
(0.958) 
- - 
GDPc 0.302 * 
(0.077) 
-1.007 * 
(0.083) 
0.195 
(0.398) 
-0.724 
(0.260) 
Unemployment 0.0066 
(0.763) 
-0.0130 
(0.784) 
0.237 
(0.661) 
0.0068 
(0.892) 
CPI 0.104 
(0.425) 
0.551 *** 
(0.004) 
0.157 
(0.403) 
0.446 ** 
(0.030) 
Import 
Penetration_lag 
-0.514 *** 
(0.002) 
0.250 
(0.268) 
-0.506 ** 
(0.013) 
0.026 
(0.913) 
 
 
74. 
NOK/GBP -0.221 
(0.185) 
-0.081 
(0.478) 
0.190 
(0.695) 
-0.031 
(0.820) 
AVE_USA_lag 0.548 *** 
(0.001) 
0.1704 * 
(0.086) 
0.506 ** 
(0.041) 
0.109 
(0.338) 
Fixed exchange 
rate dummy 
-0.0086 
(0.658) 
-0.0006 
(0.958) 
-0.0056 
(0.778) 
0.0164 
(0.234) 
AVE_NOR_lag 0.598 *** 
(0.000) 
0.7768 *** 
(0.000) 
0.637 *** 
(0.000) 
0.7894 *** 
(0.000) 
GDPc_lag  
×FC dummy 
- - -0.242 
(0.603) 
2.51 
(0.509) 
Unemployment 
×FC dummy 
- - -0.0455 
(0.415) 
0.166 
(0.481) 
CPI  
×FC dummy 
- - 0.143 
(0.806) 
0.435 
(0.656) 
Import 
Penetration_lag 
×FC dummy 
- - 0.316 
(0.407) 
1.483 * 
(0.070) 
NOK/GBP 
×FC dummy 
- - -0.672 
(0.384) 
0.453 
(0.589) 
AVE_USA_lag 
×FC dummy 
- - 0.192 
(0.727) 
0.795 
(0.106) 
Source: see table 5, p.23 in the main text 
 
*p<0.1 
** p<0.05 
*** p<0.01 
 
Appendix 15.2. OLS model divided into pre-GATT and post-GATT scenarios. Dependent variable: 
logarithmic and first differenced AVE Norway 
Independent 
Variables* 
 
*All variables are 
logged and first 
differenced 
(1)  
Pre-GATT 
(1866-1950) 
(1)  
Post-GATT (1950-
2012) 
(2)  
Pre-GATT 
(1866-1950) * 
FC 
(2) 
Post-GATT (1950-
2012) * FC 
Goodness of fit 
 
 
Durbin Watson 
Anderson Darling 
R2 : 74.20% 
R2(adj):65.18% 
 
2.26885 
P-value : 0.847 
R2: 24.03% 
R2(adj): 10.08% 
 
2.05884 
P-value: <0.005 
R2: 81.53% 
R2(adj): 69.77% 
 
2.71628 
P-value: 0.739 
R2: 28.69% 
R2(adj): 6% 
 
2.07884 
P-value:<0.05 
Financial crisis 
dummy 
0.00252 
(0.462) 
0.001145 
(0.127) 
- - 
GDPc_lag -0.0494 ** 
(0.018) 
0.0140 
(0.447) 
-0.0792 ** 
(0.024) 
0.0125 
(0.570) 
Unemployment -0.00029 
(0.927) 
-0.00084 
(0.499) 
0.00080 
(0.846) 
-0.00086 
(0.534) 
CPI -0.0378 *** 
(0.007) 
-0.00536 
(0.561) 
-0.0415 *** 
(0.007) 
-0.00467 
(0.615) 
Import 
Penetration 
-0.0932 *** 
(0.007) 
-0.0363 
(0.275) 
-0.1152 *** 
(0.002) 
-0.0421 
(0.341) 
NOK/GBP_3 lag 
*floating rate 
0.00176 
(0.117) 
-0.000163 
(0.845) 
-0.00101 
(0.541) 
-0.000040 
(0.968) 
AVE_USA 0.1499  
(0.138) 
0.0844 
(0.323) 
0.385 ** 
(0.026) 
0.110 
(0.279) 
Fixed exchange 
rate dummy 
-0.00122 
(0.689) 
-0.000156 
(0.845) 
-0.00414 
(0.133) 
-0.000191 
(0.828) 
Ave trend line  0.0506 
(0.238) 
-0.0411 ** 
(0.045) 
0.0337 
(0.400) 
-0.0515 ** 
(0.017) 
GDPc_lag  - - 0.0589 -0.0098 
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×FC dummy (0.154) (0.839) 
Unemployment 
×FC dummy 
- - -0.01062 
(0.121) 
-0.00074 
(0.872) 
CPI  
×FC dummy 
- - -0.0404 
(0.263) 
0.0260 
(0.412) 
ImportPenetration 
×FC dummy 
- - -0.120 
(0.521) 
0.0388 
(0.596) 
NOK/GBP_3 
×FC dummy 
- - 0.001158 
(0.210) 
-0.00179 
(0.386) 
AVE_USA×FC 
dummy 
- - -0.293 
(0.174) 
0.118 
(0.681) 
Source: see table 5, p.23 in the main text 
 
*p<0.1 
** p<0.05 
*** p<0.01 
 
Appendix 16: Expanding the OLS model with more determinants 
 
Appendix 16.1 The OLS model with variables as cycle deviations from HP-filtered trend including new 
determinants 
Independent Variables 
 
*all variables are gaps as cycle deviations from 
HP-filtered trend 
(iii)  
Endogenous protection model  
Goodness of fit: 
 
 
Durbin Watson 
Anderson Darling 
 
R2 : 86.92% 
R2(adj): 84.54% 
 
1.84088>DU 
P-value : 0.038 
Financial crisis dummy 0.0066 
 
GDPc 0.423* 
 
Unemployment 0.0257 
 
CPI 0.069 
 
Import penetration lagged by 1 -0.367* 
 
 
NOK/GBP 
-0.130 
Fixed exchange rate dummy  0.0034 
AVE United States lagged by 1 0.424 *** 
 
AVE Norway lagged by 1 0.6184 *** 
 
AVE trend line 0.096 
 
Average Wage -0.598 
M2 -0.0036 
M0 excl. treasuries 0.0296 
Gross Investments -0.043 
 
Source: See table 5, page 23 in the main text. For Gross Investments see Grytten (2004b), for M2 and 
M0 see Klovland (2004), for the interest rate see Klovland (2007) and for wages see Grytten (2007) 
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*p<0.1 
** p<0.05 
*** p<0.01 
 
Appendix 16.2. The OLS model with variables as percentage change including new determinants 
 
Independent 
Variables * 
 
*all variables are 
first differenced 
and transformed 
to its logarithmic 
value 
(iii)  
Endogenous protection model + 
additional variables  
(iii)  
Endogenous protection model  
+ 
Additional variables lagged at t-1 
Goodness of fit: 
 
 
Durbin Watson 
Anderson Darling 
R2 : 64.26% 
R2(adj) : 56.64% 
 
1.87900 
P-value : 0.289 
R2: 64.77% 
R2(adj): 57.35% 
 
1.93321 
P-value. 0.710 
Financial crisis  
dummy 
0.00263 * 0.00180 
GDPc_lagged -0.0420 **** -0.0415 *** 
Unemployment -0.00148 -0.00217 
CPI -0.03903 *** -0.04119 *** 
Import 
Penetration 
-0.0749 * -0.0959 *** 
NOK/GBP_lagge
d by 3 
0.000568 0.00064 
AVE_USA 0.2128 *** 0.2102 *** 
AVE_USA_lagge
d 
- - 
Fixed exchange 
rate dummy 
-0.00037 -0.00035 
AVE trend line 0.0066 -0.0029 
GATT Dummy -0.00040 -0.00081 
Average Wage 0.000 0.000 
M2 -0.000 0.000 
M0 excl. 
treasuries 
0.000 0.000 
Gross 
Investments 
0.000 0.000 
Interest Rate 0.000483 -0.000005 
Forcing 
Appreciation 
-0.00136 -0.00025 
 
Source: See table 5, page 23 in the main text. For Gross Investments see Grytten (2004b), for M2 and 
M0 see Klovland (2004), for the interest rate see Klovland (2007) and for wages see Grytten (2007)  
 
*p<0.1 
** p<0.05 
*** p<0.01 
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Appendix 17: Log and first differenced Norwegian AVE rate 
Appendix 17 First differenced and logarithmic value of the Norwegian AVE rate 
 
Source: SSB (1880-2013), Norwegian Statistical Yearbook from 1880-2013, in tables: “Imports and 
Exports.” Pdf-files covering all years are available from SSB.no (2014). 
 
Appendix 18: Direct imports as a percentage of total production by main group of industries 
 
Appendix 18 Direct Imports as a percentage of total production by main group of industries (1955 
prices) 
 
Source: (SSB, 1965, p. 202) 
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9. Glossary 
 
Ad valorem duty: “A custom tariff duty expressed as a percentage of the value of the imported goods, 
e.g. 10 per cent of the value. In the case of specific duties (i.e. US$ 2.00/kg.), the ad valorem 
equivalent can be calculated, which gives the equivalent level of the duty in percentage terms at a 
given time, that is, the year of imports used in the calculation (WTO, ITC, UNCTAD, 2011, p. 185).” 
Ad valorem equivalent: “An ad valorem equivalent is the equivalent in percentage terms of a 
specific, mixed, compound or other duty containing a specific element. Ad valorem equivalents are 
calculated for customs duties that are not ad valorem. The AVE is calculated from the actual duty 
collection or from an historical unit value of imports. For example, the AVE of a specific duty of US$ 
1/kg levied on a product with a unit value of US$ 10/kg is equal to 10 per cent (US$ 1/US$ 10) (WTO, 
ITC, UNCTAD, 2011, p. 185).” 
Contracting Party: is used for countries that have signed the GATT agreement (GATT Contracting 
Parties) and for countries that have signed the EEA agreement (EEA contracting parties).  
Custom Duty: “A customs duty is a tax levied at the border on imported goods (…). Other sources 
sometimes use the term “tariff” to refer to a duty (WTO, ITC, UNCTAD, 2011, p. 185).” 
GATT: “The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has been superseded as an international 
organization by the WTO. An updated General Agreement is now the WTO agreement governing 
trade in goods. GATT 1947 is the official legal term for the old (pre 1994) version of the GATT. 
GATT 1994 is the official legal term for the new version of the General Agreement, incorporated into 
the WTO, and including GATT 1947 (WTO, ITC, UNCTAD, 2011, p. 185).”   
Hard Law: rules and regulations that are binding upon the contract party 
Tariff: “A duty (or tax) levied upon goods transported from one customs area to another either for 
protective or revenue purposes (WTO, ITC, UNCTAD, 2011, p. 187) ” 
Uruguay Round 
Soft Law: rules and regulations that are not binding upon the contract party 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
